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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the price discovery and 
extreme value processes found in Germany's stock index and 
stock index futures markets. These two concepts are framed 
within the fundamental relationship between risk and return 
found in the financial economics literature.
Results from the price discovery analysis indicate 
that the stock index futures market processes information 
more quickly than the underlying spot market. However, 
this processing can be characterized by a feedback loop 
because sometimes the spot market processes information 
more quickly than the futures market.
An indepth analysis of the information processing 
relationship implies that the futures market processes 
information faster than most of the individual stock index 
component stocks. However, two securities sometimes lead 
the futures market. The reasons these two securities lead 
the futures market are of particular interest.
Additionally, the processing speed of the futures 
market tends to be increased when there is market-wide, as 
opposed to security-specific, information affecting the 
securities market. Also, analyses of up and down markets 
and different trading activity proxies are performed. They 
reveal that the lead-lag relation is conditional on the 
information set available to market participants.
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The results of the extreme value section indicate that 
extreme price declines for most FDAX contracts are larger 
in absolute terms than extreme price increases. The 
results of the extreme value analysis also indicate that 
the data generation process of the extreme price changes 
originate from a Type II extreme value process.
An examination of prudent margin setting procedures is 
made as a practical application of extreme value theory.
The results of this part of the study indicate that the 
extreme value distribution approximates the empirical 
extreme value observations better than the normal 
distribution process.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The risk/return trade-off relationship is a central 
paradigm in the financial economics literature and is used 
extensively as a pedagogical concept in financial economics 
education. In particular, this trade-off relationship is 
essential to the argument of efficient asset allocation of 
society's precious resources. One avenue used to 
investigate this relationship is to examine the price 
discovery process and/or risk characteristics of a 
particular security, market or basket of securities. 
Derivative securities offer an interesting avenue for 
examining the impact of price discovery and risk processes 
on resource allocation.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine both 
the price discovery and risk processes of Germany's 
derivative security markets. The price discovery process 
is examined in a lead-lag context. The particular risk 
process analyzed here is via probabilities of observing 
extreme values. These two elements are important in 
understanding how derivative securities are used by 
investors to transfer their information into efficient 
asset allocation decisions.
Extant research implies that derivative securities 
(especially stock index futures) process information more 
quickly than their underlying securities. This research
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documents that returns from derivative securities usually 
lead the returns of their underlying assets. However, 
documentation of a weak feedback of information processing 
from the underlying asset to the contingent claim also 
exists.
This dissertation uses vector autoregressive (VAR) 
methods, as described by Granger (1969), to investigate the 
lead-lag relationship between Germany's futures and spot 
markets in an attempt to determine the sources of any lead- 
lag, or feedback relationship existing in the data. Due to 
leverage effects, transaction costs, and institutional 
constraints, it is hypothesized that the derivative 
securities markets will tend to process information more 
quickly than the spot market.
To examine whether derivative securities process 
information faster than the underlying securities, a number 
of hypotheses are examined. The first hypothesis examined 
is whether DAX index futures returns lead DAX spot returns 
over a large time series of spot and futures index data.
The results of this analysis indicate that derivative 
securities process information more quickly than the 
underlying securities. However, a significant feedback 
information loop is also documented.
To further investigate the causes of the information 
processing ability of stock index futures, a number of more 
detailed hypotheses are examined. First, an examination is
made of the lead-lag relation between the stock index 
futures and the individual component securities of the DAX 
index. The results of this inspection indicate that the 
futures market processes information more quickly than most 
(28 out of 30) individual securities. However, there is an 
apparent information processing feedback loop between two 
of the individual securities (Allianz and Deutsche Bank) 
and the futures contract. One implication of this finding 
is that information processing on most individual 
securities is slower than that taking place in the futures 
market. With respect to Allianz and Deutsche Bank, each of 
these firms hold asset portfolios consisting of many other 
firms. In a sense, these two firms may be proxies for the 
market as a whole.
There may be many reasons why there exists a lead-lag 
relation in the DAX and DAX index futures contracts. One 
of these reasons relates to the difficulty German investors 
have in short-selling individual securities. An 
examination of up and down markets is made to explore this 
issue. The result of this section is surprising in that 
the lead time of the futures market is substantially 
reduced, though feedback still exists. Apparently, the 
short selling restrictions in Germany do not entice 
participants with bad news to trade their information in 
the derivative securities market. Market expectation 
alignment during extreme up and down markets is given as a
reason for the reduction in processing speed in the futures 
market.
Much attention has been paid by financial market 
research to defining information proxies. One of these 
proxies comes under the rubric of trading activity. In 
particular, the number of transactions, trading volume, and 
the number of securities trading per time periods have been 
postulated as proxies for information. Hence, examining 
the lead-lag relation considering these proxies of trading 
activity can be an important indication as to whether 
information processing is affected by differential levels 
of market activity. The results of this test, however, are 
mixed. Essentially, the lead-lag structure depends upon 
the definition given to trading activity. The implication 
here is that more research related to information proxies 
is needed.
If investors wish to decrease trading costs, 
derivative securities offer one route to obtain this 
objective. In particular, stock index futures contracts 
allow investors an option to trade market-wide, or macro­
based information with lower transaction costs than trading 
individual securities. Depending on whether an investor 
possesses market-wide (macro related) or security-specific 
(micro related) information, he may choose the derivative 
or underlying security. Examining this issue in a lead-lag 
context allows one to determine the information processing
5speed of each market when investors are confronted with 
different types of economic information. The results of 
this analysis indicate that under heavy market-wide 
movements, the derivative market's information processing 
advantage is expanded. The implication here is that the 
leverage effects and low transaction costs of the 
derivative securities market are an attractive alternative 
to investors endowed with macro or market-wide information.
Regarding the risk process, much research has been 
done using ARCH and GARCH models for modelling risk 
conditional on past information. This dissertation takes a 
different but complementary path in that the risk process 
considered is found in the probabilities of observing 
extreme values. The idea is that extreme values may well 
be considered the "ultimate" risk measure because they 
represent precipitous changes in wealth. If abrupt changes 
in wealth are undesirable, the contribution of this 
analysis is determining the probability of observing large 
negative wealth effects found in extreme values.
Extreme value theory - as applied to financial markets 
by Longin (1994), Jansen and De Vries (1991), Koedijk, et. 
al. (1992) and Akgiray, et. al. (1988b) - is used to 
examine the tail distribution of the futures return series. 
Since extreme value analysis is a relatively new branch of 
the financial literature, this part of the dissertation 
adds much to the body of financial knowledge.
6The results of this section indicate two facts related 
to the DAX futures data: (1) price declines are larger in 
absolute value than price increases, and (2) the extreme 
price changes follow a Type II extreme value distribution. 
The Type II extreme value process indicates highly 
leptokurtotic tail behavior and an increased probability of 
observing large stock price changes. Examples of parent 
distributions that generate Type II extreme values are the 
t-distribution, the Cauchy distribution and other 
leptokurtotic data generation processes, such as ARCH and 
GARCH. This result is intuitively pleasing because it 
conforms to extant research indicating non-normality of 
stock return distributions.
As a practical application of extreme value analysis, 
prudent margin setting requirements are examined. The 
thrust of this section is related to curbing losses due to 
extreme price movements in Germany's stock index futures 
market. Findings are that the extreme distribution is 
better suited to curbing losses than using a normal 
distribution process when setting margin levels. A 
normative application of this result is that margin setting 
committees should use extreme value theory when setting 
prudent margin levels.
CHAPTER 2 
PRICE DISCOVERY
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
Derivative securities are defined as financial assets 
that derive their value from other financial assets. Stock 
index futures fall under the category of derivative 
securities because they are assets based on the value of a 
basket of securities. In particular, the basket of 
securities are those securities that make up the particular 
stock index of interest.
According to the no arbitrage condition of the spot 
futures parity theorem, the value of a stock index futures 
contract is a function of the underlying stock index, a 
factor to account for a risk free level of interest rates, 
a factor to account for leakage (usually a dividend yield) 
if any, and a factor to account for the time to maturity. 
The spot futures parity theorem, also called the cost of 
carry relationship, is shown in its functional form in 
Equation 1.
F=f(I,RflD, T) , (1)
where F is the futures price, I is the value of the index 
in question, Rf is the risk free rate of interest, D is an 
appropriate dividend yield, and T is the time to maturity 
of the futures contract.
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In a perfect world, futures prices will 
instantaneously reflect all information related to the 
underlying stock index, interest rates and appropriate 
dividend yields. However, research related to the price 
discovery processes of stock index and stock index futures 
markets infers that the derivative asset processes 
information more quickly than the underlying asset. This 
result may lead one to infer that the underlying asset 
derives its value from the derivative asset.
Examination of lead-lag relationships is not specific 
to the spot and futures return relationship, however. 
Manaster and Rendleman (1982) examine the lead-lag 
relationship between stocks and their associated stock 
options. The authors find that the returns for stock 
options usually lead the returns on the underlying stocks. 
However, Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that the lead-lag 
relationship is the opposite of the result found by 
Manaster and Rendleman (1982). Returns on the individual 
stocks appear to lead the returns on their options.
Brockman (1994) provides evidence supporting Manaster and 
Rendleman's explanation when he finds that returns to 
primes and scores lead those of their underlying stocks.
Finally, Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1990), and Chan,
Chan and Karolyi (1991) examine the lead-lag relationship 
of volatility in the S&P 500 spot and futures markets. The
results from these studies indicate that volatility is 
transmitted much more quickly than price changes.
Finnerty and Park (1987) were the first to examine the 
price discovery processes of stock index futures markets. 
They analyze the relationship between the futures contract 
of the Major Market Index and its associated spot index. 
Their model accounts only for the futures price change that 
occurred one minute before the spot return. Even though 
they include dummy and interaction variables for contract 
expiration effects, they examine only the transmission of 
information from the futures to the spot market and do not 
consider the possibility of information being transmitted 
from the spot to the futures markets. The results of their 
analysis show that stock index futures usually lead the 
spot market in price discovery - a phenomenon the authors 
label "a case of the tail wagging the dog."
Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) examine the lead-lag 
relationship of the S&P 500 futures and spot markets for 
various trading days in 1984 and 1985. Using minute-by- 
minute data, for different daily time periods of the 
contract (88, 60, 30, 14, and 1 day(s) prior to expiration 
and expiration day), the authors find that futures price 
changes lead spot price changes up to 45 minutes, while the
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spot price changes lead the futures price changes by no 
more than 2 minutes.1
Stoll and Whaley (1990) also study the lead-lag 
relationship between the S&P 500 and Major Market spot and 
futures markets (from 1982-1987 for the S&P and from 1984- 
1987 for the Major Market). The authors find that the S&P 
500 futures tend to lead the S&P 500 index up to 15 
minutes. However, the leading market direction is not 
found to be unidirectional, i.e. hints of the spot market 
leading the futures market are also documented. Results 
for the Major Market index and associated futures contract 
are similar to those found for the S&P 500 market, except 
that the feedback relationship from spot to futures is 
almost non-existent.
In a related study, Chan (1992) examines the lead-lag 
relationship between the S&P 500 and Major Market spot and 
futures markets for the time period covering 1984-1987. 
Using an approach similar to Stoll and Whaley '(1990) , Chan
(1992) documents the existence of a lead-lag relationship 
(also up to 15 minutes).
'Their model (a bivariate VAR-type model) is similar 
to the type used in this paper; however, they allow the 
contemporaneous price change of the futures and spot 
indices to enter the model when the spot and future price 
changes are the dependent variables. Contemporaneous price 
changes are usually constructed for convenience of analysis 
purposes. In reality, very few observations are actually 
"contemporaneous."
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The first study on the price discovery process of the 
stock index futures market in Germany was carried out by 
Grtinbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994). These authors 
find that the lead time for returns in Germany's futures 
market over its spot market is longer than that documented 
in the U.S. market. Specifically, evidence is presented 
that the electronically traded futures market leads the 
floor-based spot market by approximately 20 minutes instead 
of the 15 minutes found in the S&P and Major Market studies 
of Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Chan (1992). Interestingly 
though, Griinbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) also 
find that the spot market leads the futures market by 
approximately five minutes, although this lead is weak.
If spot and futures prices are assumed to follow the 
paths set out under the spot-futures parity relationship, 
one would expect to see price changes in the spot market 
move in tandem with price changes in the futures market.2 
However, empirical results indicate that the futures market 
tends to process information more quickly than the 
underlying spot market. Researchers have argued that 
arbitrage opportunities, infrequency of trading, bid-ask 
spread effects, mechanical time delays, transactions costs, 
and other factors may explain the information processing
technically, contemporaneous movements of both spot 
and futures price series would only occur if the component 
stock dividend yields and applicable interest rates were 
non-stochastic.
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advantage of the stock index futures market. "Herding" 
theories, similar to those found in Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988), Bhushan (1991), and Chowdry and Nanda (1991) have 
also been used to explain the information processing 
advantage. Discretionary traders "herd" during the same 
time period, on the same asset, or in the same market, 
respectively. The herding theories imply that uninformed 
investors tend to concentrate their trading in order to 
reduce losses to informed traders. On the other hand, 
informed traders will want to trade in the market where it 
is less costly to reveal their information.
Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) state that market 
sentiment and arbitrage trading may be two phenomena 
affecting the temporal linkages between spot and futures 
markets. Since changes in investor sentiment can only be 
transmitted through the spot index after all the relevant 
stocks trade at different prices from the previous index 
calculation, the index may reflect updated market sentiment 
with a lag. Market sentiment can cause the futures market 
to lead the spot market when investors react to bullish or 
bearish macro-economic factors.
The futures market could also more quickly reflect new 
macro-economic information because of the lower initial 
investment required. Additionally, portfolio rebalancing 
or stock selection decisions are not required. However, 
futures traders may rely on recent changes in the
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underlying spot market for an indication of the direction 
of future prices.
Since the transactions costs of a futures transaction 
are less than the transactions costs of trading the 
component stocks of an index, market participants who have 
expectations about market-wide movements, rather than 
individual stock movements, may elect to trade in the 
futures market instead of the spot market. Loistl and 
Kobinger (1993) document that round-trip transaction costs 
of a futures transaction are approximately 1/100 as costly 
as the round-trip transaction costs of trading all the 
stocks comprising the DAX index. If investors want to 
trade where it is least costly, it is hypothesized that 
investors informed with macro-economic information in 
Germany will tend to trade in the futures market. However, 
it may still be possible for an investor to become informed 
on an individual stock, or sub-group of stocks, and reveal 
his information through trades in the spot market.
Chan (1992) also acknowledges that the lead-lag 
relationship may depend on whether information arriving to 
the market is market-wide or firm-specific. If information 
is market-wide, informed investors may prefer to trade in 
the lower cost market, instead of having to engage in 
individual stock selection and to incur higher transactions 
costs. When information is macro in nature, the futures 
market is in a position to lead the spot market by a longer
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time period than when there is not a large amount of 
market-wide information. Conversely, if information is 
firm-specific or even industry-specific, the spot market 
may lead the futures market when traders respond to firm- 
specific news related to their individual stock holdings 
more quickly than futures traders.
Chan (1992) deduces that the information processing 
advantage of the futures market is due primarily to market- 
wide movements of asset returns, as opposed to the 
infrequency or intensity of trading, or good or bad news 
events. Chan (1992) finds that after accounting for a 
changing infrequent trading structure (news events or 
trading intensity effects) the lead-lag relationship is 
stronger the more individual stocks move together (market- 
wide movements).
Chan (1992) stipulates that when a larger number of 
component stocks make up an index, the futures market leads 
the spot market more strongly. He concludes that the 
asymmetric lead-lag relationship between the futures and 
the spot market is attributable to faster information 
processing and a more efficient ability to recognize 
market-wide information by the futures market.
If trading in both markets is largely dominated by 
little or no arbitrage opportunities, market sentiment 
activities affect the spot and futures prices in the same 
direction. However, if arbitrage opportunities persist,
arbitrageurs begin to take opposite positions in each 
market, causing any "normal” lead-lag relationship to 
alter. According to Kawaller, Koch, and Koch (1987), 
changes in the lead-lag relationship during arbitrage 
opportunities may manifest themselves either when both 
markets move in the same direction (with one series moving 
more quickly than the other), or when they move in opposite 
directions. Hence, there may be a dynamic lead-lag 
relationship between the spot and futures index markets, 
depending on whether market sentiment or arbitrage 
conditions are present.
Stoll and Whaley (1990) also discuss some of the 
factors that may account for the existence of a lead-lag 
relationship between the S&P 500 and Major Market futures 
and spot markets. Infrequent trading, negative serial 
correlation induced by the bid-ask spread of individual 
stocks in an index, and the mechanical time delays in 
reporting stock trades and/or the relevant index are each 
mentioned as possible ways for a lead-lag relationship to 
exist. These authors use an ARMA (Autoregressive Moving 
Average) model to mitigate infrequent trading and bid-ask 
problems. The autoregressive (AR) portion of the model is 
shown to moderate infrequent trading problems whereas the 
moving average (MA) portion is shown to temper noise 
introduced by the bid-ask spread.
Chan (1992) discusses additional phenomena that may 
cause the futures market to lead the spot market. For 
example, short-selling restrictions are discussed as one of 
the reasons for the existence of a lead-lag relationship. 
Since Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) document that short- 
selling restrictions retard the adjustment of prices to 
private information, Chan (1992) postulates that short- 
selling restrictions placed on institutional or insider 
traders in the spot market will cause the futures market to 
lead the spot market, especially in the presence of bad 
news.
Bamberg and Roder (1994) note that only institutional 
traders are eligible to short-sell individual securities in 
Germany. Therefore, when individual investors possess 
adverse private information, and want to trade on that 
information, they must go through the futures market.
Since there are little or no short-selling restrictions in 
the futures market, the futures price discovery process may 
tend to lead the spot market, especially in down markets.
Chan (1992) notes that there may also be a 
relationship between price discovery and the intensity of 
trading in each market. Due to Admati and Pfleiderer's 
(1988) finding that both liquidity and informed traders 
prefer to trade when the market is thick, either through a 
high level of trading volume or transaction activity, more 
information may be released in thick, rather than thin,
17
markets. Chan (1992) postulates that the increased 
information released through thick trading directly impacts 
upon any existing lead-lag relationship.
Another factor that may impact the differential 
information processing capabilities of the spot or futures 
market is the advent of fully computerized trading systems. 
Huang and Stoll (1992) discuss some of the important issues 
to consider when designing automated trading systems, and 
Domowitz (1993) develops a taxonomy of automated trading 
systems. Domowitz (1993) classifies different automated 
trading systems along the lines of priority of trade 
execution, degree of automation of the price discovery 
process, and transparency of the system. He finds a broad 
spectrum of systems in existence. In general, however, 
most automated trade execution systems contain some level 
of sophistication in that there exists a trade-matching 
algorithm combined with information display and 
transmission mechanisms.
The futures market found in Germany's Futures and 
Options Exchange, operating under the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange (FSE), is the automated Deutsche Termniborse 
(DTB). As of 1993 the DTB had approximately 75 members 
utilizing approximately 550 terminals for order entry, 
order confirmation, and examination of trading activity.3 
Even though the system was recently only operational in
information obtained from Table 1 in Domowitz (1993).
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Germany, an agreement with the MATIF, France's futures and 
options exchange, has allowed access to the system for 
traders not physically located in Germany. A thorough 
discussion on the market microstructure issues in Germany 
is found in Griinbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994), 
and Booth et.al. (1995). Specific plans concerning who 
will obtain access to the DTB outside of Germany is found 
in German Stock Exchanges —  Annual Report 1992.
The first classification scheme used by Domowitz
(1993) is the priority of trade execution. This 
classification scheme determines the priority given to 
orders in the system that await execution. The DTB's 
priority of trade execution is a combination of price and 
time priority. This combination of priority gives 
preference to the best price available for purchase or 
sale, and then accounts for the time an order spends at a 
particular price, not necessarily the amount of time the 
order has remained unmatched in the system. As compared 
with other automated systems used on futures and options 
exchanges, the DTB maintains an average priority of trading 
algorithm.
The degree of automation in the price discovery 
process is closely related to the economic efficiency of 
the automated trading algorithm because it dictates how 
prices are determined. The differences in algorithm 
capabilities examined by Domowitz (1993) range from a
19
system having to receive transaction prices from outside 
(basically an input of a transaction occurring off the 
system) to a fully automated continuous double auction 
system using some type of pricing model to determine the 
price of any transaction. The DTB uses the most popular 
type of price discovery algorithm used by automated trading 
systems - the automated continuous double auction 
algorithm. Like other systems employing this algorithm,
DTB transactions occur when orders are crossed. A price is 
determined within the system (as determined by the 
previously mentioned priority rules) and a transaction 
occurs when the best offer to buy is greater than or equal 
to the best offer to sell. According to Huang and Stoll 
(1992), a continuous double auction trading system, like 
that found on the DTB, is the preferred algorithm for 
efficient price discovery. Therefore, DAX (Deutscher 
Aktienindex) futures contracts are traded on a system with 
one of the highest levels of automated price discovery 
actually used by computerized trading exchanges.
The final classification discussed by Domowitz (1993) 
is the transparency and anonymity of the automated system. 
Huang and Stoll (1992) define transparency of a system as 
"the degree to which trading information is made publicly 
available." When more trading information is available (on 
transaction prices and volume for instance), the trading 
system becomes more transparent. On the other hand,
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anonymity is defined as the degree to which traders can 
transact without revealing their identity. The less 
information revealed by the system about a trader's 
identity, the more anonymous the system.
For the most part, screen-based trading systems are 
extremely anonymous. Very few systems offer any kind of 
identification of the trader on the other side of the 
transaction, while none offer counterparty information to 
the public. Domowitz implies that stock and bond trading 
systems appear to offer more information to the interested 
public than futures and options systems. Therefore, an 
information asymmetry is being introduced between direct 
and indirect system participants where informed traders may 
be able to hide more of their private information if they 
participate in an automated market rather than on a regular 
floor-traded system. The DTB is extremely transparent in 
that it displays the last transacted price, as well as the 
prices and volume for transactions in the automated order 
book. The DTB is also completely anonymous in that no 
information related to the counterparties of transactions 
is displayed or transmitted. Therefore, informed traders 
may be well-hidden when transacting through the DTB.
Huang and Stoll (1992) discuss some of the main 
concerns with increased transparency and anonymity.4 In
4Massimb and Phelps (1994) compare and contrast the 
operational efficiencies and loss of liquidity due to 
electronic trading systems. Even though they conclude that
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particular, a situation similar to Akerlof's (1970) lemons 
market may cause trading to cease, due to the increased 
level of asymmetric information. However, these concerns 
may be mitigated by preferencing of order flow. In 
general, automated systems must balance transparency and 
anonymity with the reputation capital of traders (market 
makers). If market makers' identities are completely 
anonymous, they will not be able to assume responsibility 
for the quality of the market (i.e. show their fairness to 
both sides of a transaction) and possibly may be unable to 
attract sufficient order flow to unwind adverse positions 
or to provide necessary immediacy to the market. Huang and 
Stoll's suggestion is to allow for a system to be flexible 
and afford some type of preference-based trading based on 
past or current order flow or possibly on reputation. The 
DTB, like many of the other automated futures and options 
systems, does not allow for preference-based transactions.
Design-based classifications may have an effect on the 
lead-lag relationship found in Germany's spot and futures 
markets. Massimb and Phelps (1994) discuss the mechanical 
characteristics of an automated trading system (increased 
information dissemination, decreased settlement time, 
decreased number of wrongly-entered trades, etc...), which
the loss of liquidity dominates the gains in efficiency 
offered by today's technology, they suggest that 
applications of advanced technology to the traditional 
floor trading systems may alter the loss and gain 
relationship.
decrease the time period necessary to report spot and 
futures transactions. If the computerized system is used 
to facilitate the mechanical operations of markets, 
operational efficiencies could possibly be increased. If 
the increased operational efficiencies are greater in the 
spot market than in the futures market, one could 
hypothesize that any lead-lag relationship advantage (often 
attributed to the futures market) would be shortened. 
However, if the operational efficiency gains are greater in 
the futures market than in the spot market, any existing 
lead-lag relationship favoring the futures market may be 
increased.5 Analyzing the information processing 
capability between a spot and futures market where one 
market maintains a traditional floor trading technology, 
and the other market adopts a purely electronic trading 
system may be one way to probe technological or mechanical 
efficiency gains from adopting an electronic trading 
system.
Germany's stock exchange is composed of both an "old- 
fashioned" floor trading system for its spot market and an 
electronic screen trading system that handles its futures 
transactions. Both the S&P 500 spot and futures markets 
are traded on traditional floor traded systems. In
sDiscussions related to lowering costs of market 
operation via automated exchanges are also found in Harris
(1990). Increased operational efficiency arguments are 
found in Grossman (1990) as well.
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reality, however, Germany's spot market is a hybrid floor- 
automated market, where an electronically traded spot 
market, IBIS (Integrietes Borsenhandels- und Informations- 
System), accounts for nearly 15-25% of the spot markets 
trades.
Analyzing the lead-lag relationship between the spot 
and futures markets using German data and comparing the 
results to the S&P 500 lead-lag relationship potentially 
adds valuable data to the information sets of policy makers 
evaluating the prospects of incorporating screen trading 
systems technology into their markets. If the technology 
provided from electronic trading systems can increase 
information processing speed, then markets utilizing the 
new technology could perhaps boast faster price discovery, 
higher operational efficiency, and possibly lower costs to 
market participants.6 These operational and economically 
desirable exchange characteristics could, in effect, create 
a strategic advantage useful in the increasingly 
competitive market for security traders.
Even though the consensus of extant empirical research 
implies an information processing advantage to futures and 
or electronic markets, it maintains the possibility that 
spot and/or traditional floor markets periodically have the 
advantage. At this point, it is useful to recall two
fyassimb and Phelps (1994) provide evidence refuting 
the lower cost claims often extolled by electronic trading 
system advocates.
factors that may affect the information processing 
advantage of the technology based futures market found in 
Germany. First, Loistl and Kobinger (1993) document a 
significantly lower futures market transaction cost in 
Germany. Second, IBIS trades essentially make the spot 
market a hybrid between old-fashioned floor trading 
activities and one embracing new technological 
efficiencies. Therefore, attributing any price discovery 
advantages directly to technology, or transaction costs, is 
not as straightforward as that discussed in Griinbichler, 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1994)
To examine empirically the information processing 
relationship between spot and futures and electronic and 
traditional floor systems, this study analyzes the lead-lag 
relationships between the price changes for German DAX and 
S&P 500 stocks by employing a bivariate VAR system.7 
Results of this research find that the S&P 500 futures 
returns lead the S&P 500 spot returns by about 35 minutes, 
and that Germany's futures returns lead spot returns by 
approximately 23 minutes.
However, both markets exhibit evidence that the spot 
returns lead futures returns: up to five minutes for the
7This study employs a system related more closely to 
the Granger (1969) approach rather than the Sims (1972) 
approach. Since most of the extant literature focuses on 
U.S. markets, the S&P 500 data will be used only as a 
comparison. No indepth analysis of the lead-lag relation 
will be made for the S&P 500 data.
S&P and up to two minutes for the DAX. Discovering the 
phenomenon that each market leads the other implies that 
there is a significant information feedback relationship 
present for both markets; therefore, no complete price 
discovery domination by either market exists. Implications 
of the feedback relationship are that traders in the 
futures market appear to transmit information to the spot 
market; on occasion, however, traders in the spot market 
appear to transmit information to the futures market, 
regardless of the technology or transactions costs of the 
trading system. Therefore, from an information processing, 
or price discovery, standpoint, it is not readily apparent 
that the traditional floor traded S&P 500 futures market or 
the German electronic screen-traded futures market 
completely dominates its corresponding spot markets in 
information processing capabilities.
An additional result found is that the S&P 500 spot 
and futures markets exhibit cointegration. The associated 
error correction model does not appear to alter the 
feedback relationship found in the non-error corrected 
model. However, the DAX spot and futures markets do not 
exhibit cointegration. Due to the significant feedback 
relationship, it appears that the electronic trading system 
found in Germany does not completely dominate the floor 
trading system in information processing capability, as 
implied by Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994).
The contribution of this dissertation {as related to 
the S&P 500 lead-lag relationship) is that the model 
employed here allows for explicit testing of Granger 
causality and cointegration between the spot and futures 
market. When not accounting for cointegration, the S&P 500 
results parallel those of Kawaller, Koch, and Koch (1987), 
i.e., futures returns lead spot returns by approximately 35 
minutes and spot returns lead futures returns by 
approximately 5 minutes.
The results here find that the S&P 500 spot and 
futures markets are cointegrated. Thus, by the Granger 
Representation theorem, the correct model specification to 
examine the lead-lag relationship must incorporate an error 
correction term.8 After including the error correction 
term, however, the lead-lag structure remains relatively 
unchanged.
The contribution of this dissertation (as it relates 
to the German spot futures lead-lag relationship) is to 
investigate more closely the lead-lag relationship found on 
the FSE between the spot and futures markets. Using a 
finer time grid of data (1 minute instead of 5 minutes) and 
a different method of analysis (bivariate VAR, instead of
8Error correction terms indicate that there is a long 
run equilibrium condition relating the spot and futures 
markets to one another. That is, economic forces exist 
which prevent either market's deviation from the spot 
futures parity theorem, at least for extended periods of 
time.
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Sims) than Grunbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994), 
this paper investigates the causal relationships between 
the DAX spot and futures markets. Also, the hypotheses 
examined in this dissertation are based on information- 
linked explanations, not technology based notions, as found 
in Griinbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) .
The results of this paper also match well with 
Grunbichler, Longstaff, and Schwartz's (1994) results. The 
lead of the futures price changes is found to be 
approximately 23 minutes, not 20. Even though the lead of 
the price changes of the spot market over the futures 
market appears to remain around 5 minutes, the results of 
this paper more closely examine the lead time. It is 
hypothesized that the significant feedback relationship is 
due to information-based ideas, and not the hybrid nature 
of the spot trading system.
2.2 HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED
2.2.1 Hypothesis #1
Ho: There is ho lead-lag structure to the DAX stock 
and stock index futures market.
Ha: There exists a lead-lag structure to the DAX stock 
and stock index futures markets.
Stoll and Whaley (1990), Kawaller, Koch and Koch 
(1987) and Chan (1992) all indicate that the stock index 
futures market processes information faster than the 
underlying stock market in the United States. Griinbichler, 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) also find a lead-lag
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structure to the German DAX and DAX index futures market. 
This hypothesis examines the information processing issue 
in Germany's security markets using a much longer time 
series of data and a much finer time grid of observations 
than that employed by Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1994). Examining this hypothesis on this unique dataset 
is useful because it gives researchers an indication of the 
persistence of Germany's DAX futures markets information 
processing advantage, if one exists.
2.2.2 Hypothesis #2
Ho: The DAX futures market leads all component stocks 
in fashion similar to the index.
Ha: The DAX futures market leads component stocks 
differently than the index.
According to Chan (1992), testing this hypothesis is 
important for two reasons. First, determining which, if 
any, stocks lead the futures is useful information for 
investors constrained from participating in the futures 
markets. Second, testing this hypothesis allows a closer 
inspection of the lead-lag relation through a decreased 
importance of the infrequent trading problem.9
2.2.3 Hypothesis #3
Ho: The lead-lag relation is the same in up and down 
markets.
Ha: The lead-lag relation is different in up and down 
markets.
9Even though the infrequent trading problem is 
virtually eliminated via examining individual stock 
activity, the return interval is increased from a one 
minute to five-minute interval in order to maximize 
observations.
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As mentioned previously, individual investors in 
Germany cannot short-sell individual stocks. Therefore, 
the alternative hypothesis would be that the futures market 
tends to lead the spot market in down markets because 
individual investors cannot short-sell individual stocks 
for whatever reason.
Chan (1992) defines up and down markets as those 
markets that have large negative or positive returns.10 
Movements in the DAX spot market are used as the proxy for 
up and down markets. Essentially, each spot market's 
intradaily return (minute-by-minute) will be ranked into 
deciles according to each data point's position in that 
day's returns. Then, the lead-lag relationship will be 
examined only on the lowest and highest deciles (the down 
and up markets).
Examining the data in this fashion allows for a 
clearer picture of the short-selling restrictions found in 
Germany. A priori, the down-market expectation is that any 
feedback relationship will cease to exist and that the 
price discovery process of the futures market will be 
accelerated. A priori up-market expectations are not as 
clear.
,0Strictly speaking, Chan (1992) coins the terms "good 
news and bad news" instead of "up market and down market" 
as used here.
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2.2.4 Hypothesis #4
Ho: The lead-lag relation is similar under different
trading activity.
Ha: The lead-lag relation is different under different
trading activity.
This hypothesis examines and tests the Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988), Bhushan (1991), and Chowdry and Nanda
(1991) uninformed traders' "herding" behavior hypotheses. 
Essentially, uninformed investors will want to protect 
themselves from informed traders' activities by grouping 
together either through time of trades, securities or in 
particular markets. Additionally, Easley and O'Hara (1987) 
suggest that informed investors want to trade their 
information as quick and in as large amounts as possible, 
creating a link between the information and the volume 
associated with a transaction. Informed traders will want 
to trade when many uninformed traders are trading.
Since the data set used in this dissertation is rich 
in transaction information (i.e. transactions, and volume 
information are available) for the spot market, a 
significant advantage over the analysis of Chan (1992) is 
made.11 As proxies for the trading intensity of the spot 
market, trading intensity will be defined as the number of 
firms traded per time interval, number of transactions per 
time interval, and the volume of shares traded per time
“Chan's (1992) proxy of trading intensity only 
accounts for the number of transactions taking place in 
both the spot and futures markets.
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interval. Finally, to examine Easley and O'Hara's (1987) 
informed trader impacts, an average volume per transaction 
variable will be created as a proxy for trading intensity.
The analytical approach here will be similar to that 
used in the up and down market hypothesis. Each trading 
intensity proxy will be ranked daily. Then the lead-lag 
examination will be performed on the top and bottom decile 
for each market. Due to the unique data set available, it 
is expected that much information related to how traders 
reveal their information will be obtained from this 
hypothesis test.
2.2.5 Hypothesis #5
Ho: The lead-lag relation between the spot and futures 
markets is the same under heavy market-wide price 
movements as it is under security specific price 
movements.
Ha: The lead-lag relation between the spot and futures 
markets is different under heavy market-wide price 
movements as it is under security specific price 
movements.
One of the advantages of trading through the futures 
market is the ability to decrease transactions costs when a 
trader has market-wide information. Since the tremendous 
cost differential between trading in Germany's futures 
contracts and trading in the spot market has previously 
been mentioned, expectations are that this hypothesis will 
be rejected in favor of its alternative. A method of 
counting the number of securities moving in one direction 
at any given time will be used to test this hypothesis.
This method is similar to Chan's (1992) definition of
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market-wide information. Again, DAX spot returns will be 
grouped into deciles according to the ratio of securities 
moving in the same direction (this is the proxy for market- 
wide movements) and the lead-lag relation of the top and 
bottom decile will be analyzed using the same methods as 
previously mentioned in the other testable hypotheses.
2.3 DATA DESCRIPTIONS
2.3.1 S&P 500 Data
The S&P 500 spot and futures data used in this study 
consist of intradaily data from Tick Data Corporation. The 
period covered is from January 1, 1986 to December 31,
1993. The S&P 500 index calculation is based on the market 
value of the component stocks and is calculated by the 
following formula:
where nJt is the number of outstanding shares for firm j at 
time t, PJt is the current stock price for firm j, and Base 
Value is the average value of the index during 1941-1943 
(assigned to be 10).12 Dividends paid by the component 
stocks do not enter into the index calculation.
S&P 500 futures contracts are traded on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange between the hours 08:30 and 15:15
500
(2 )
12Details about the composition of the S&P 500 come 
from Tucker (1991).
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central time. Expiration is based on quarterly contracts 
(March, June, September, and December) settled on the third 
Friday of each expiring month.
The S&P 500 is made up of 400 industrial firms, 40 
utilities, 20 transportation firms, and 40 financial 
institutions comprising approximately 75% of the total 
market value of the NYSE. The intradaily time period 
examined is that when the NYSE is open (08:30 to 15:00 
central time). However, an additional 15 minutes is 
examined to catch any lagging observations added to the 
data set after market closure. Even though there are many 
trading observations made within any given minute, the data 
used for contemporaneous observations are the last price 
change for every minute of the time period analyzed.
The range of the S&P 500 index data is 203.44 to 
470.91 while the range of the S&P 500 futures data is 
202.00 to 471.80. An overlay plot of opening index and 
futures values is found in Figure l. A casual observance 
of Figure 1 indicates that the S&P 500 spot and futures 
markets generally trended upward, except for the notable 
market downturns due to the 1987 crash and bearish market 
environment found at the end of 1990. Figure 1 indicates 
that the two series moved in synchronous fashion over the 
time period analyzed, and hence, do not appear to show any 
information being processed more quickly by either market - 
at least not on a daily basis.
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Figure 1
Overlay of S&P 500 Spot and Futures 
Daily Opening Values
General statistical information regarding the S&P 500 
spot and futures returns is found in Table 1. Non­
normality of both series is indicated by the Kolmogorov D- 
statistic. The spot return series appears to be negatively 
skewed, while the futures return series exhibits positive 
skewness. Both series, however, are highly leptokurtotic. 
Also, even though both series have essentially zero 
returns, the futures return series is 6.58 times as 
variable as the spot return series.
Table 1
Average S&P 500 Index and Futures Returns. 
816,168 observations.
Index Returns Futures Returns
Mean 9.939E-7 1.068E-7
Variance 4.459E-8 2.934E-7
Skewness -0.107 3.972
Kurtosis 55.702 1035.15
D* 0.136 0.121
Minimum -0.008 -0.042
V
Maximum 0.009 0.079
* Kolmogorov D-statistic, critical value at 0.1% 
significance level is 0.009.
standard error for excess Kurtosis is 0.05. Standard error 
for excess Skewness is 0.003.
2.3.2 DAX Index Data
The DAX index data used in this study consist of 
intradaily data provided by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(FSE) and covers the time period January 1, 1992 to March 
31, 1994. The DAX index is a total-performance index
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consisting of 30 stocks, where the weights used in the 
calculation are based on each component firm's listed 
capital. The formula for calculating the DAX index is as 
follows:
Kt is a general correction factor used once a year to avoid 
jumps in the index when a component firm's capital figures 
are brought up to date. Pu is the current stock price for 
firm i, Qu is the weight used for weighting each firm's 
market value, and Cit is the correction factor used for 
stock option and dividend information. Note that even 
though market values change over time, the weights used in 
calculating the DAX change only once a year. Dividends 
paid by component stocks of the DAX are treated as if they 
are reinvested in their respective stocks when calculating 
the index.
The intradaily time period analyzed is between 10:30 
am and 1:45 pm (the FSE is open from 10:30 am to 1:30 pm). 
Even though the FSE opens at 10:30 am, DAX calculations are 
not made until trading on any component stock is completed. 
That is, DAX calculations do not necessarily begin at 
exactly 10:30 am. Also, to allow for instances where some
30
X1000. (3)
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trades require extra time to be posted to the system, this 
study examines DAX index postings until 1:45 pm.13
DAX index data are stamped with date and time to the 
nearest second. However, calculation of the index is done 
only once a minute and only after at least one component 
stock is traded. When there are lulls in trading, and no 
component stocks trade, no new date- and time-stamped DAX 
calculations are made for the next minute. Since returns 
in this study are calculated as ln(Pt/Pt_,), missing DAX 
quotations would cause some returns to be minute returns, 
two-minute returns, three-minute returns, etc.
To ensure that returns are generated by a minute-by- 
minute time series of prices, DAX index values are carried 
over to fill time gaps in the data. In essence, this 
process creates a zero return for any minute that does not 
have a DAX observation, thereby creating a truer process of 
index returns not captured by the furnished database. 
Carryover of the observations also replicates more 
accurately the information set available to market 
participants watching information displayed on their 
terminals.
The DAX index data series contains 96,988 intradaily 
observations, of which, 5,238 (5.4%) carryover observations
13The earliest observation is at 10:33 am and the 
latest observation is at 1:40 pm.
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were added to the data. The range of the DAX index for the 
time period is 1416.52 to 2322.00. A plot of opening DAX 
values over time is found in Figure 2.
Cursory observation of Figure 2 indicates that the DAX 
Index rose steadily until June 1992. A bearish market 
environment then ensued until early April 1993. The last 
year or so of data appear to show the DAX on an upward 
trend.
2.3.3 DAX Futures Data
The DAX futures data used in this study consist of 
intradaily data provided by the electronically based 
futures market, the DTB. Trading in futures contracts 
occurs from 10:30 to 16:00. The futures data are generated 
by individual futures transactions and recorded with date 
and time stamps to the nearest hundredth of a second. For 
the entire sample period and entire time the futures market 
is open, there are 530,781 futures transactions available 
for analysis.
Similar to the DAX Index market, the futures market 
periodically experiences lulls in activity that cause time 
gaps in the data. To ensure minute-by-minute data, 
carryover of futures prices into gaps found in the futures 
data set is made. Even though it can be argued that 
carrying over futures observations creates stale prices, 
only 3% of the futures data were replicated. One 
justification for the carryover of these prices is to have
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a consistent interpretation of the regression results.14 
Essentially, in order to make time-based inferences of the 
regression results, a consistent minute-by-minute lag 
structure must be maintained.
DAX Futures contracts are based on a quarterly 
expiration cycle. Expiration of the DAX contracts occurs 
on the third Friday of the expiration month. Therefore, 
the last trading done on an expiring contract occurs on the 
Thursday before expiration Friday. As stated in Biihler and 
Kempf (1993), settlement on expiration day is based on the 
DAX calculation the first minute after at least 50 percent 
of the DAX component stocks trade. Therefore, the futures 
settlement price can consist of trades that take place at 
different times during the day. In this study, all 1992, 
1993, and the March 1994 futures contracts are examined.
Following the convention set out by Kawaller, Koch and 
Koch (1987), Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992), and 
Grunbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), this study 
examines only the nearest futures contracts, defined as the 
contract with the nearest expiration date. The nearest
l4Kofman and Moser (1994) experience the same missing 
data problem in their analysis of the BUND futures data 
from the DTB. They also use carryover observations in 
their examination of the lead-lag relationship between BUND 
trading on the DTB and the LIFFE (London International 
Financial Futures Exchange).
contract is followed until maturity.15 A plot of the first 
daily futures transactions over time can be found in the 
overlay of spot and futures data found in Figure 2. The 
futures price pattern followed that of the DAX Index. One 
interesting feature seen in Figure 2, however, is that the 
opening futures price appeared to be generally higher than 
the spot market during the bear market experienced in 1992. 
The overlay indicates that the two price series did not 
appear to diverge often over the time period examined. 
Therefore, Figure 2 does not appear to suggest that 
information was processed consistently faster by the 
futures markets on a daily basis.
2.3.4 DAX Component Stocks Data
As previously stated, the basket of DAX stocks 
consists of 30 individual securities. These securities 
represent firms in the financial and industrial sectors and 
comprise the majority of market value and trading volume on 
the FSE. The dataset for the individual securities was 
provided by the FSE and contains date, price and time-stamp 
information. Beginning April 1, 1993, the dataset also 
includes volume information. A listing of the specific 
securities is found in Table 2.
liMa, Mercer, and Walker (1992) indicate that switching 
contracts on the expiration date induces excessive 
volatility into the futures price series. Since this 
portion of the dissertation examines only the first moment 
instead of the second moment of the future price series, 
examination of the nearest futures contracts similar to the 
aforementioned research is done here.
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Table 2 
DAX Component Stocks
Firm Name Mean Var Skew Kurt D
Allianz -0.001 0.020 -0.001 7.520 0.259
BASF 0.002 0.021 0.362 8.296 0.241
Bayer 0.001 0.018 0.171 5.085 0.223
Bayrische Hypobank -0.000 0.018 -0.021 10.920 0.340
BMW -0.000 0.023 0.386 12.714 0.332
Bayrische Vereinsbank -0.000 0.017 0.069 10.725 0.353
Commerzbank -0.002 0.019 -0.179 7.094 0.308
Continental -0.001 0.046 0.630 21.181 0.368
Daimler -0.002 0.015 -0.057 3.896 0.214
Deutsche Babcock 0.003 0.061 0.020 29.648 0.364
Deutsche Bank -0.001 0.008 -0.057 5.060 0.226
Degussa 0.003 0.046 -0.037 19.424 0.358
Dresdner Bank -0.001 0.016 0.149 9.180 0.327
Henkel -0.000 0.020 0.292 18.534 0.364
Hoechst 0.003 0.022 0.310 7.395 0.244
Karstadt -0.001 0.032 0.240 15.560 0.363
Kaufhof Holding -0.002 0.047 -0.201 25.197 0.337
Lufthansa -0.005 0.087 -0.400 14.096 0.366
Linde 0.000 0.024 0.166 14.645 0.374
MAN 0.002 0.038 0.614 21.720 0.338
Metallgesellschaft -0.005 0.094 -0.789 24.191 0.343
Mannesmann 0.000 0.028 0.330 9.494 0.285
Freussag 0.003 0.029 0.586 17.157 0.329
RWE 0.000 0.015 0.509 19.306 0.324
Schering 0.001 0.033 0.221 26.610 0.283
Siemens -0.001 0.011 -0.406 5.832 0.206
Thyssen 0.001 0.033 0.110 8.906 0.327
Veba -0.000 0.010 0.230 10.008 0.259
Viag 0.002 0.024 0.708 22.876 0.328
Volkswagen 0.001 0.027 -0.058 4.347 0.235
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A preliminary examination of the firm-specific dataset 
indicated that calculating minute-by-minute returns would 
have caused too many carry over observations to be entered 
in the data. Therefore, 5-minute price change intervals 
are used to calculate return information and to perform 
analyses related to the individual stock related data.
Table 2 also provides basic statistical information 
related to the 5-minute return series generated for each 
security. All stocks have essentially an average zero 5- 
minute return, various skewness positions and exhibit 
excess kurtosis. Finally, the Kolmogorov D statistic 
indicates that the firm-specific data is non-normal. This 
non-normality is probably a result of the leptokurtotic 
data generation process.
2.3.5 Contemporaneous Observations Data
Contrary to the five-minute contemporaneous return 
convention used in Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992), 
and Griinbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), this study 
maintains the informational content of the minute-by-minute 
data inherent in the DAX spot data set when examining 
Hypotheses #1 and #3. However, since the futures database 
contains approximately six observations per minute, and the 
DAX spot data contain only one observation per minute, a
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criterion for selecting which futures observations are 
contemporaneous to the spot data has to be formulated.16
The criterion for selecting contemporaneous 
observations in this study is to select the closest futures 
observations that precede DAX observations by up to 59 
seconds.17 The criterion for selecting contemporaneous 
observations resulted in 93,977 contemporaneous spot and 
futures returns. Futures observations precede spot 
observations an average of 17 seconds.
General statistical information regarding the 
contemporaneously generated DAX spot and futures returns is 
found in Table 3. Non-normality of both return series is 
indicated by the Kolmogorov D-statistic. The index return 
series is positively skewed whereas the futures returns 
data exhibit negative skewness. Both series, however, have 
high levels of kurtosis.
l6Since only 122 observations had precisely the same 
time stamp, very few observations are "truly" 
contemporaneous.
17Selecting contemporaneous observations in the manner 
described introduces a bias for spot returns to lead 
futures returns. That is, more information is incorporated 
in a later time series. For example, if a futures 
transaction is recorded 20 seconds past the minute, whereas 
the index calculation is not made until 50 seconds past the 
minute, the spot market incorporates the information 
present at 20 seconds past the minute plus any information 
reaching the market before the 50-second mark. Analyzing 
the data where the futures observations were chosen as the 
nearest before or after observation, or to follow spot 
observations by 59 seconds, did not alter the results.
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Even though both series have essentially a zero 
return, the futures return series is 3.111 times as 
variable as the spot return series. Higher volatility in 
the DAX futures market is also documented by Griinbichler, 
Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994) (variance ratio average of 
1.27 for 5-minute data) and Biihler and Kempf (1993) 
(variance ratio average of 3.08 for minute-by-minute 
data) .18
Table 3
Average DAX Index and Futures Returns and Average 
seconds Futures Prices precede DAX prices.
93,997 observations.
DAX Spot 
Returns
DAX Futures 
Returns
Mean 1.200E-7 -2.560E-6
Variance 5.560E-8 1.730E-7
Skewness 0.113 -0.812
Kurtosis 61.174 240.06
D* 0.13 0.26
Minimum -0.006 -0.028
Maximum 0.006 0.019
* Kolmogorov D-statistic, critical value at 0.1% 
significance level is 0.014.
Standard error for excess Kurtosis is 0.026. Standard 
error for excess Skewness is 0.008.
I8The variance ratio found on the DAX is approximately 
50% less than that found ir. the S&P 500 data set. Whether 
this difference can be attributed to differential levels of 
noise or information between floor and electronic trading 
is unclear.
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2.4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
2.4.1 Causality/ Sims Approach
The lead-lag relationship, as described in Sims (1972) 
and used in Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan (1992), and 
Griinbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994), can be 
represented by a model similar to Equation 4:
* V « + E  Rft*i+et' (4)
i--n
where K1, is the return in the spot market, J/, is the return 
in the futures market, and e, is the error term.
Sims (1972) gives a practical test for unidirectional 
causality that requires a joint test of significance of the 
parameters on the future values of If the future 
values of Ff, (i.e. i>0) are jointly insignificantly 
different from zero, and assuming that past values exhibit 
some reasonable significance, then unidirectional causality 
from the futures to spot markets is implied.
Also, Sims (1972) proposes that a simple inspection of 
the size of the coefficients on the future values can be an 
indication to reject the null of unidirectional causality, 
regardless of the significance of the joint tests. Results 
from Stoll and Whaley (1990) display that the size of the 
future values of are as large, and in some cases larger, 
than the coefficients of the past values (see Table 4 in 
Stoll and Whaley (1990)). Therefore, even with no explicit
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significant tests, results from Stoll and Whaley (1990) 
imply bidirectional causality (feedback) between the S&P 
500 spot and futures markets.
As noted by Chan (1992), examining the lead-lag 
relationship by testing the significance of lead-lag 
coefficients of models similar to Equation (4) does not 
necessarily mean that price movements in one market cause 
price movements in the other market. More appropriately, 
the "lead" refers to one market processing information 
faster than the market that "lags" behind in its 
information reaction time. Chan's (1992) significance 
tests on the future values of the futures data indicate a 
significant feedback relationship existing between both the 
Major Market and S&P spot and futures markets (See Table 4 
in Chan (1992)).
From an intuitive standpoint, an additional comment 
can be made about the Sims (1972) lead-lag relationship 
(Equation (4)) adopted by Stoll and Whaley (1990), Chan
(1992), and Griinbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994). 
Often, when one thinks about regression techniques, the 
concept of using independent variables to "predict" 
dependent variables comes to mind. With the concept of 
prediction in mind, Equation (4) uses past values of 
futures data to predict future values of spot data. Then, 
Equation (4) uses future futures data to predict past 
values of spot data. Beyond finding statistical
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significance of the coefficients on the future futures 
data, it is difficult to make inferences about future 
futures data "predicting” past spot data. That is, using 
the Sims approach makes it difficult to grasp, intuitively, 
which information set is being used by the investor.
Chan (1992), Stoll and Whaley (1990) and Griinbichler, 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) all find that futures markets 
appear to lead their respective spot markets in information 
processing ability. However, they also provide evidence 
that the spot markets appear to lead their respective 
futures markets. This result appears to indicate 
bidirectional causality (feedback) between spot and futures 
markets. As a direct test for possible feedback, and to 
avoid the "predictability” problem, Granger Causality tests 
are used.
2.4.2 causality, Granger Approach
The Granger Causality Theorem is proposed in Granger 
(1969). In its simplest form, the null of Granger 
noncausality is depicted by Equation (5):
H0if(xt\xt.n) =f{xt\xt_B,yt_B) . (5)
That is, variable y will not cause variable x, if the 
distribution of x (given only past values of x) is equal to 
the distribution of x (given past values of x and y). 
Therefore, y will cause x if predictions of x using past 
values of x and y are better than predictions only using x. 
If y causes x and x causes y, then a feedback system is
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said to exist. Taking expectations of Equation (5) allows 
the hypothesis of causality to be tested by ordinary least 
squares regression techniques. For instance, Equation (5) 
can be represented by the regression format symbolized by 
Equation (6):
n n
*t=«o+E Mt-i+E Piyt-i+et- (6>
i-l i-l
Jointly testing the null hypothesis that the 0/s are 
zero is accomplished by calculating an F-statistic from the 
restricted and unrestricted regressions of Equation (6).19 
If the F-statistic is significant at some a priori 
determined level of significance, then rejection of the 
null that the 0/s are zero infers that y causes x.
Lindley (1957) notes that with a large number of 
observations, significance levels should be lowered. 
Therefore, unless otherwise noted, this study uses the 
0.01% level of significance for its rejection criteria 
instead of the usual 5% or 1% significance levels.
19Strictly speaking, using the Wald test statistic 
(Chi-Squared distributed) is the only test required. 
However, using an F-distributed random variable (the Wald 
statistic divided by the number of restrictions being 
tested) as the test statistic is more conservative 
(requiring a larger statistic before rejection of the null) 
than the Chi-squared statistic. Therefore, the test 
statistic chosen to examine joint hypotheses in this 
portion of the dissertation is the F-test.
2.4.3 Bivariate Vector Autoregression
Regressions similar to Equation (4) were used by Stoll 
and Whaley (1989), Chan (1992), and Griinbichler, Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1994) to analyze lead-lag relationships 
between American and German spot and futures markets. 
However, this paper analyzes results from the following 
bivariate vector autoregressive equation:20
n m
R S£=ai+X/
i-l i-l
n m
i-l i=l
where R1, is the spot market return at time t and R^  is the 
futures market return at time t. Use of the bivariate 
vector autoregressive process in the form represented by 
Equations (7) and (8) explicitly allows causality and 
feedback issues to be addressed.
Stoll and Whaley (1990) show that an index return is 
well-described by an ARMA process. The AR (Autoregressive) 
portion is shown to mitigate the effects of infrequent 
trading of the stocks comprising the index. Furthermore, 
the MA (Moving Average) portion is shown to moderate the 
effects of the bid-ask spread. Hence, Equation (8) also
20Note the difference between this equation and 
Kawaller, Koch, and Koch's (1987) model, i.e. 
contemporaneous Beta coefficients are not found in the 
model employed in this dissertation.
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allows the infrequent trading bias of index returns to be 
addressed.
Haller and Stoll (1989) use Roll's (1984) method for 
calculating implied bid-ask spreads in the German market. 
Even though they find statistically significant implied 
spreads for small stocks, the implied spread for the 
largest DAX stocks is statistically insignificant in both 
the continuous dealer and noon auction markets. Since this 
study only examines large DAX stocks, the MA component is 
not considered and the AR convention as used by Chan (1992) 
and Griinbichler, Longstaff and Schwartz (1994) is adopted 
in this part of the dissertation.21
Therefore, the bivariate vector autoregressive 
framework adopted in this study, Equations (7) and (8), 
works around the "predictability" problem previously noted 
by using only regressors that are lagged with respect to 
the dependent variable. Secondly, the framework 
simultaneously accounts for infrequent trading effects. 
Finally, the equations used in this study test directional 
causality and examine any feedback relationships between 
both spot and futures markets.
2iTo temper the effect of the infrequent trading bias, 
previous studies performed an AR regression on the index 
and then used the return innovations created from that 
regression as the dependent variable for Equation (4). Use 
of Equation (8) serves the dual purpose of simultaneously 
moderating infrequent trading effects and allowing a 
directional causality relationship to be tested in one 
regression.
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2.4.4 Cointegration Considerations
Theoretically, there is a no-arbitrage condition that 
drives the relationship between spot and futures prices, as 
Equation (9) suggests:
Ft=St(l+rf-d)T, (9)
where F, is the futures index price at time t, S, is the 
actual spot index price at time t, rf is the risk-free 
interest rate, d is the dividend yield paid by stocks in 
the index, and T is the time to maturity of the futures 
contract. Equation (9) is usually designated as the spot- 
futures parity theorem or cost-of-carry relationship. This 
parity relationship is an arbitrage relationship, since 
deviations of actual prices from theoretically predicted 
prices allow risk-free returns to be obtained with zero net 
investment.
Economic theory suggests that if deviations from the 
parity relationship are large, economic agents would 
attempt to obtain a "free lunch." The quest for this "free 
lunch" would induce forces that diminish deviations to the 
level where transactions costs erase any arbitrage profits. 
Therefore, activities undertaken to temper arbitrage 
profits are likely to bring spot and futures prices 
together so that they do not drift too far apart.
Research on price deviations from the parity 
relationship can be found in work conducted by Stoll and
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Whaley (1986), MacKinlay and Ramaswamy (1988), and Modest 
and Sundaresean (1983). Results from those studies 
indicate that violations of the parity relationship occur 
less than 15% of the time in U.S. markets. Evidence that 
the S&P 500 spot and futures prices move closely together 
is also provided in Figure 1.
Loistl and Kobinger (1992) show that some short-term 
arbitrage opportunities existed in the September 1991 DAX 
futures contract, but very few long-term arbitrage 
opportunities were available. Evidence that German spot 
and futures index prices remain close together is also 
provided in Figure 2. Additionally, Btihler and Kempf
(1993) show that arbitrage opportunities in the DAX futures 
market drastically diminished within the first year of 
operation. Therefore, equilibrium forces that reduce 
arbitrage profits imply a long-term relationship probably 
exists between spot and futures prices.
Cointegration tests are designed to analyze long-run 
economic relationships. If spot and futures prices are 
found to be cointegrated, then the regression formulations 
set out in Equations (7) and (8) are misspecified and must 
be modified to include an error correction term. 
Specifically, if the data are cointegrated, Equations (7) 
and (8) should be modified to yield:
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i-l i-l
13 m
R  f t= a 2 + X )  Y i 2 ^  ff-i+ S  P i ^ S e-i+ < l > 2 ( ^ - l - ^ - l )  + e c  ( 1 1 )
i-l i-l
The second-to-last terms in equations (10) and (11) are 
called the error correction terms and are designed to 
reflect the current error that the model contains in 
achieving long-run equilibrium.22 In essence, the error 
correction terms act as the long-term economic forces that 
diminish arbitrage opportunities presented by short-term 
perturbations causing deviations from the spot-futures 
parity relationship.
The error correction terms in equations (10) and (11) 
have another economic definition; they are the basis 
between the futures and spot prices. If the basis is 
exceptionally large, meaning that the futures price is 
above (or that the spot price is below) its equilibrium 
level, then two alternatives may occur: the futures price 
adjusts downward, or the spot price adjusts upward. 
Therefore, 0j in equation (10) is hypothesized to be non­
positive, while 02 in Equation (11) is hypothesized to be 
non-negative.
“Technically, the error correction terms are the 
errors resulting from a cointegrating regression, not just 
the difference between the two level variables.
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To test for cointegration between spot and futures, 
this study follows a three-step process. First, a check 
for stationarity and equivalent integration of the two 
price series is made using the methodology set out by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979)i
in
Rt=a+$lnPt_1+'£/YiRt_1+kt+ett (12)
i*>l
in
AJ2e=a+pjJe_1+ £ Y i A * c-j+At+ee. (13)
If the |3 from Equation (12) is insignificantly different 
from zero and the /? from Equation (13) is significantly 
different from zero, then the price series are 1(1) 
variables and may be cointegrated. Results of regressions 
from Equations (12) and (13) are located in Table 4. t-
statistics for the fi's from Equation (12) are -1.898 and -
2.113 for the DAX spot and futures, and -3.052 and -2.367 
for the S&P 500 spot and futures. Equation (13) yields t- 
statistics of -49.577 and -51.367 for the DAX spot and 
futures and -236 and -196 for the S&P 500 spot and futures.
Results from Table 4 indicate that the spot and 
futures prices for both the DAX and S&P 500 are 1(1) 
variables, i.e. their first differences (returns) are 
stationary and their prices may be cointegrated.
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Table 4 
Tests for Unit Roots
Equation (12)
Levels
SPOT MARKET FUTURES MARKET
t-statistic t-statistic
DAX -1.898 DAX -2.113
S&P 500 -3.052 S&P 500 -2.367
Equation (13)
First Differences of 
Levels
SPOT MARKET FUTURES MARKET
t-statistic t-statistic
DAX -49.577 DAX -51.367
S&P 500 -236.44 S&P 500 -196.514
MacKinnon (1991) has calculated the appropriate t-values 
for the 5% and 1% significance levels to be respectively -
3.7809 and -4.3266. Even though this study uses 0.01% as 
its rejection criteria, it is assumed that a statistic of - 
10 or smaller is significant at the 0.01% level.
The second step followed to test for cointegration is to 
run the following cointegrating regressions:
lnPst=a1+pinPft+>.t+vt;I/ (14)
lnPfc=a2+pinPst+A.t+vt2. (15)
The final step in testing for cointegration is to take the 
errors from Equations (14) and (15) and analyze them for 
stationarity similar to the analysis carried out by 
equations (12) and (13):
If |3 from Equation (16) is significantly negative, then the 
price series are cointegrated. Results from regressions 
run on Equation (16) are found in Table 5. t-statistics 
are -1.241 and -1.322 for the DAX errors of Equations (13) 
and (14), and -25.179 and -25.146 for the S&P 500 errors of 
Equations (13) and (14). MacKinnon (1991) calculates the 
1% significance level to be -4.3266. Therefore, results 
from Table 5 indicate that the German spot and futures 
markets are not cointegrated and that Equations (7) and (8) 
may be used without the error correction terms. However, 
the S&P 500 spot and futures markets are cointegrated, 
requiring Equations (10) and (11) to be used when analyzing 
the lead-lag relationship.
At first glance, finding no cointegration in the DAX 
data series appears to be counter-intuitive to the 
explanation of the spot-futures parity concept discussed 
earlier.23 There may be a straightforward explanation as
23Dwyer and Wallace (1992) indicate that finding 
cointegration and/or not finding cointegration does not 
directly imply efficient or inefficient market conditions. 
They state that finding cointegration is a phenomenon 
specific to the model used for testing for cointegration. 
One example cited is the case of examining exchange rates 
written in terms of a common currency. The fact that the 
stochastic trend between two countries' cancels out has no 
implication towards market efficiency or inefficiency. 
Rather it is a consequence of the no arbitrage, zero 
transactions costs model.
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to why the DAX data series is found not to be cointegrated 
while the S&P 500 series is found to be cointegrated.
If natural logs of Equation (9) are taken, the following 
equation results:
lnFc=lnSc+Tln(l+rf-d) . (17)
Examining Equation (17) in a cointegrating regression 
format yields:
InFt=a+blnSt+c[In(l+rf-d)] T+et. (18)
The parity theorem suggests that e, is stationary, 
i.e. an 1(0) variable, and that InF, and InS, are 
cointegrated. Brenner and Kroner (1995) document that 
there is only one scenario that may yield a cointegrating 
relationship between the spot and futures price, and that 
occurs when the interest rate and dividend yield are 
cointegrated.24 Since the subtraction of two 1(1) 
(nonstationary) variables may yield an 1(0) (stationary) 
variable, it appears that the data for the S&P 500 indicate 
cointegrated intradaily interest rates and dividend yields. 
This finding is important since Bradley and Lumpken (1992) 
provide evidence that interest rates are 1(1) variables.
24Even though Brenner and Kroner's proposition is based 
on a proof using realized spot and current futures prices, 
the stationary basis scenario also applies to the 
cointegration of contemporaneous spot and futures prices 
via the no-arbitrage parity relationship.
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However, research on the level of integration in dividend 
yields has not yet been published.
Table 5
Stationary tests for Cointegration residuals, vt, 
from Equations (14) and (15).
V, from regression of Spot on Futures (Equation (14)) .
Market t-stat
DAX -1.241
S&P 500 -25.179
V, from regression of Futures on Spot (Equation (15)).
Market t-stat
DAX -1.322
S&P 500 -25.146
MacKinnon (1991) has calculated the appropriate t-values 
for the 5% and 1% significance levels to be respectively -
3.7809 and -4.3266. Even though this study uses 0.01% as 
its rejection criteria, it is assumed that a statistic of - 
10 or smaller is significant at the 0.01% level.
Even though Brenner and Kroner (1995) state that "the 
question of whether spot and futures prices are 
cointegrated has not been addressed in the literature," 
evidence of cointegration in the S&P 500 spot and futures 
markets has recently been presented by Ghosh (1993) and 
Dwyer, Locke and Yu (1994). Ghosh (1993) examines 15- 
minute intradaily return data for every Wednesday in 1988 
for the S&P 500 and finds that the two series are 
cointegrated and that cointegration is helpful in 
predicting movement from one market to the other. Dwyer, 
Locke and Yu (1994) examine intradaily minute return data 
for the last 13 weeks of the nearest futures contracts in
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1989 and 1990 for the S&P 500 and find that the majority 
(but not all) of the contracts exhibit cointegration. They 
support their hypothesis of a dynamic nonlinear 
relationship between the spot and futures prices with the 
fact that cointegration is present when constructing a 
threshold error correction model. Therefore, the finding 
that the S&P 500 is cointegrated adds to the sparse 
literature on the existence of cointegration between equity 
spot and futures markets.25
There may be a simple explanation as to why the DAX 
spot and futures markets are not cointegrated.26 Looking 
back on the definition and calculation of the DAX Index 
(see Equation (2)), one notes that dividends are included 
in calculation. Biihler and Kempf (1993) state that 
inclusion of the dividend makes the DAX a "total 
performance index" and that the appropriate parity 
relationship between the spot and futures price is:
2SBrenner and Kroner (1993) state that fixing the 
expiration date and varying the time to maturity of the 
futures contract, as done in this dissertation, induces a 
time-varying variance in the cointegrating residuals.
Since the test statistics of the cointegration tests appear 
to be large (around -25), it is assumed here that 
cointegration will be robust to the presence of 
heteroskedastic cointegrating errors.
26The author wishes to thank Paul Brockman for help 
with this explanation.
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Ft‘St(l+Zt) T. (19)
where the variables maintain the same definition as in 
Equation (9). If natural logs are taken in Equation (19), 
the following relationship exists:
Examining Equation (20) in a cointegrating regression 
format yields:
Comparing Equation (21) to Equation (18) yields insight as 
to why the DAX data series is not cointegrated while the 
S&P 500 series is cointegrated.
If interest rates are 1(1), as evinced by Bradley and 
Lumpkin (1992), then their impacts will be transmitted to 
the error of the cointegrating regression. Since the 
stochastic nature of 1(1) variables always dominates the 
stochastic characteristics of 1(0) variables, there will be 
no 1(1) dividend yield to cancel the interest rate effect. 
Hence, a unit root test of the cointegrating errors will 
never reject the unit root null. Instead it will fail to 
reject the null of no cointegration between the two series. 
In the case of the DAX, or other total performance indices, 
Brenner and Kroner (1995) state that the cointegrating 
relationship must now contain the futures price, the spot
lnFt=lnSt+Tln(l+rf) . (20)
lnFt=a +blnSt+c[In(l+rf) ] T+ec. (21)
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price, and the interest rate information.27 
Thus, it is the misspecification of the cointegrating 
regression that generates the nonstationary errors, not the 
incorrect nature of the parity theorem. Since rejection of 
the null that e, is an 1(1) variable is central to 
determining whether the variables are cointegrated, using a 
model that generates non-stationary error terms will never 
allow cointegration to be concluded.
2.5 CAUSALITY RESULTS
Since the results of cointegration tests imply that 
the DAX spot and futures data are not cointegrated, this 
research analyzes the relationship between the German Spot 
and Futures markets using Equations (7) and (8). However, 
since the cointegration tests imply that S&P 500 spot and 
futures markets are cointegrated, analysis of the lead-lag 
relationship is accomplished using both Equations (7) and 
(8), and (10) and (11). In this manner, the effect of 
including the error correction term can be analyzed.
For the S&P 500 data, this paper follows the 
convention set out by Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987) by 
setting the lag length of the lagged dependent variable to
27In technical terms, the cointegrating vector will now 
be trivariate (1,-1,-1), instead of the bivariate 
cointegrating vector (1,-1) apparently present in the S&P 
500 data. An examination of the impact of intradaily 
interest rate information on the cointegration test for the 
DAX and DAX Futures is an interesting issue and will be 
conducted in future research.
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60 minutes while setting the lag length of the cross market 
to 45 minutes. For the German data, Griinbichler, Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1994) indicate that DAX Index Futures returns 
lead Dax Index returns by about 20 minutes. However, since 
this dissertation uses minute-by-minute data, the lag 
lengths for Equations (7) and (8) are set to 30 minutes to 
account for any additional information possibly not 
captured in the 5-minute dataset.28
Even though extending the lag length of the DAX data 
may reduce the efficiency of the OLS estimator in this 
case, Gonzalo (1990) shows that the efficiency loss is 
small. More importantly, however, is to assure that the 
residual term in a lagged dependent variable regression, is 
a white noise process. That is, the residual term must 
exhibit no autocorrelation pattern. This white noise 
characteristic is critical to obtain since OLS standard 
errors are inconsistent when autocorrelation is present in 
these models. Inconsistent standard errors cause 
inferences drawn from hypothesis tests to be wrong.
White noise tests (not reported) on the error terms from 
the applicable DAX regressions indicate that 
autocorrelation, to lag 24, is not present. Therefore, 
setting the lag length to 30 minutes for the DAX data
280vernight returns are not computed. That is, a 
previous day's returns do not enter into the long lags of 
the regression.
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ensures the analysis to err on the side of obtaining 
consistent, rather than efficient standard errors.
2.5.1 Hypothesis #1 Results29
Hypothesis #1 was stated as:
Ho: There is no lead-lag structure to the DAX stock
and stock index futures markets.
Ha: There exists a lead-lag structure to the DAX stock
and stock index futures markets.
The next four sections discuss the results of this 
hypothesis test.
2.5.1.1 S&P 500 Spot Results, No Error Correction 
Term
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of the parameter 
estimates for the regression of S&P 500 Spot returns as the 
dependent and independent variables with a 99.99% 
confidence interval around the null of a zero value. 
Significant parameters are found to lag 6. Thereafter, they 
become insignificant. Figure 4 displays a similar graph 
for the parameter estimates of the lagged S&P 500 Future 
returns as independent variables. Significant lagged 
future returns are found approximately to lag 33. An F- 
test testing the significance of the lagged future returns 
yields a value of 1013.29, which has an associated p-value 
of <0.0001. Therefore, S&P 500 future returns Granger- 
cause S&P 500 spot returns.
29Recall that the S&P 500 analyses are made for 
comparison purposes only.
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Figure 3 
S&P 500 Spot Return as Both 
Dependent and Independent Variables
Figure 3's graphic was generated by the parameter estimates 
and upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the 
following regression:
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Figure 4
S&P 500 Spot Return Dependent Variable 
and S&P 500 Futures Returns as Independent Variable
This graphic was generated by the parameter estimates and 
upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the following 
regression:
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2.5.1.2 S&P 500 Future Results, No Error Correction 
Term
Figure 5 is the graphical representation for the 
regression with S&P 500 futures returns as both dependent 
and independent variables. The parameter estimates bounce 
frequently between negative and positive values. The 
negative parameter for lag 1 may be indicative of a bid-ask 
spread bounce in the futures market.
Figure 6 displays a similar graph for the parameter 
estimates of the lagged spot returns. Significant spot 
returns are only found to lag 3, and after, they are not 
significantly different from zero. An F-test for the 
significance of all the lagged spot return parameter 
estimates being equal to zero results in a value of 79.217, 
which has an associated p-value of <0.0001. Therefore, S&P 
500 spot returns Granger-cause S&P 500 future returns.
The results from sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 are similar 
to those presented by Kawaller, Koch and Koch (1987). The 
lead-lag relationship (without an error correction term) 
found in this work coincides well with their analyses. 
Apparently, the faster information processing speed of the 
S&P 500 futures market is persistent over time. However, 
this study documents that a significant feedback 
relationship between the S&P 500 spot and futures markets 
also exists.
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S&P 500 Futures Return Dependent Variable 
and S&P 500 Futures Returns as Independent Variable
Figure 5's graphic was generated by the parameter estimates 
and upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the 
following regression.
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Figure 6
S&P 500 Futures Return Dependent Variable 
and S&P 500 Spot Returns as Independent Variable
Figure 6's graphic was generated by the parameter estimates 
and upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the 
following regression.
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2.5.1.3 S&P 500 Spot and Future Results/ With Error 
Correction Term
Accounting for the error correction term does not 
alter the lead-lag structure found in the non-error 
corrected analysis. Therefore, only a discussion of the 
error correction parameter estimates will be made.
The parameter estimates on the error correction term 
in Equation (10) are negative, and significantly different 
from zero (p-value < 0.0001). The parameter estimate on 
the error correction term in Equation (11) is positive and 
also significantly different from zero (p-value < 0.0001). 
The signs of the parameter estimates on both error 
correction terms are as hypothesized given the appropriate 
correcting mechanism. Apparently, large deviations from 
the spot-futures parity relationship are corrected through 
either market for this data and time period analyzed.
2.5.1.4 DAX Spot Results
Figure 7 is the graphical representation of the 
parameter estimates of Equation (7) with DAX spot returns 
as both the dependent and independent variables. White 
noise tests on the errors imply that a lag length of thirty 
minutes is a sufficient AR process to mitigate an 
autocorrelated error term.
Figure 8 is the graphic of parameter estimates, along 
with the confidence limits of the regression of Equation 
(8). Examining the coefficients on the lagged future 
returns reveals significance to approximately lag 23. This
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lag length is longer than that documented by Griinbichler, 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1994). An F-test for the 
significance of the coefficients on the futures data yields 
a value 254.67, which is significant at the 0.0001 level. 
Therefore, the DAX futures returns Granger-cause the spot 
returns.
2.5.1.5 DAX Futures Results
Figure 9 is the graphic representing the regression 
with DAX Futures as both the dependent and independent 
variables. White noise tests also indicate that a lag 
length of 30 sufficiently reduces the possibility of 
autocorrelated errors.
As far as the regression with DAX Futures as the 
dependent variable and lagged spot data as independent 
variable is concerned, statistically significant 
coefficients are found only to lag 2 (See Figure 10).
After this, the parameters fluctuate randomly around zero. 
This result supports those found in Griinbichler, Longstaff, 
and Schwartz (1994) that the DAX spot market leads the 
futures market by up to 5 minutes. However, the finer time 
grid of data used here allows a closer inspection of the 
relationship.
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Figure 7
DAX Spot returns as Both Dependent and 
Independent Variables
Figure 7's graphic was generated by the parameter estimates 
and upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the 
following regression.
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DAX Spot returns as Dependent and 
DAX Futures returns as Independent Variables
Figure 8's graphic was generated by the parameter estimates 
and upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the 
following regression:
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An F-test for the significance of all the lagged spot 
parameter estimates yields a value of 103.19, which is 
significant at the 0.0001 level. Therefore, the spot 
returns appear to Granger-cause the future returns.
Evidence is presented supporting the notion that the 
DAX futures market leads the DAX spot market by at least 23 
minutes. However, the spot market has significant 
parameters to 2 minutes. Therefore, a significant feedback 
relationship also exists in Germany's DAX index and DAX 
index futures markets.
The fact that the lead length of the futures market 
over the spot market is long tends to infer that the 
futures market always dominates the information processing 
characteristics of the spot market. However, the 
documented feedback relationship indicates that this is not 
always the case, and that a conclusion of "futures markets 
returns always leading spot market returns" is incorrect.
Hence, the documented feedback relationship in this 
data provides evidence supporting the null of this 
hypothesis. That is, a feedback relationship means that 
both markets lead each other and suggests that there is no 
persistent one-sided lead or lag structure in the DAX stock 
index and stock index futures market, even though the 
futures market processing time appears faster.
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DAX Futures Returns as Both the 
Dependent and Independent Variables
Figure 9's graphic was generated by the parameter estimates 
and upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the 
following regression.
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Figure 10
DAX Futures Returns as the Dependent 
and DAX Spot as the Independent Variable
This graphic was generated by the parameter estimates and 
upper and lower 99.99% confidence limits from the following 
regression.
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2.5.2 Hypothesis #2 Results
Hypothesis #2 is stated as:
Ho: The DAX futures market leads all component stocks
in fashion similar to the index.
Ha: The DAX futures market leads component stocks
differently than the index.
To test this hypothesis, five minute returns for each 
security are generated. Then, the corresponding five 
minute returns for the DAX futures contracts are matched by 
date and time to the DAX component stock data. To maintain 
a 30 minute lead-lag time window, the lag lengths in 
Equations (7) and (8) are set to 6. Parameter estimates, 
and their corresponding significance levels (p-values) in 
parenthesis, from the lead-lag regressions for the 
individual DAX component stocks are presented in Table 6.
The table is read in the following manner. First, 
Table 6 is broken into panels of information related to 
each stock. Within each individual stock panel, there are 
two subpanels: one for the regression with the company's 
return as the dependent variable (Equation (7)), and one 
for the regression with the DAX futures return as the 
dependent variable (Equation (8)).
For example, BASF, the first company listed in Table 
6, shows that its own return lagged one period results in a 
parameter estimate of -0.1998 that is significant at a p- 
value of 0.0001. The lagged futures data indicate 
significant parameters out to lag 6. On the other hand,
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when the futures returns are the dependent variable, BASF's 
lagged returns do not show any significant parameters at 
the 0.0001 level. The F-test for causality in this example 
indicates that the futures market Granger causes BASF's 
stock return, but not vice-versa. There is no feedback of 
information in this example, only unidirectional causation 
from the futures to the individual stock.
An examination of Table 6 indicates that there is no 
discernable information processing advantage attributed to 
28 out of 30 individual stocks. That is, none of the 28 
individual stocks appear to lead the futures market in 
information processing. However, the futures market leads 
each individual stock from around 10 to 30 minutes, 
depending on the stock in question.
The test for Granger causality, however, is a joint 
test of the hypothesis that the cross-market variables are 
zero. This joint hypothesis test is carried out for each 
stock and the calculated F-statistic with associated 
significance level is found in Table 7.
The results presented in Table 7 complement those 
found in Table 6 and can be summarized as follows. First, 
For 28 out of 30 DAX component stocks, the DAX futures 
market Granger causes the individual security. Since no 
feedback of information processing is present, the 
causation is unidirectional. This result simply means that
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Table 6 
Lead-Lag Regression Results 
for the Individual Component DAX Stocks
BASF
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1998 -0.1595 -0.0577 -0.0446 -0.0419 -0.0123
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1479)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4901 0.2332 0.1097 0.0873 0.0702 0.0651
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0117 -0.0588 -0.0285 0.0234 0.0204 0.0283
(0.2071) (0.0001) (0.0039) (0.0167) (0.0345) (0.0029)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0006 -0.0158 0.0215 -0.0028 0.0023 0.0072
(0.9282) (0.0135) (0.0008) (0.6615) (0.7063) (0.1966)
BMW
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1131 -0.0798 -0.0686 -0.0323 -0.0401 -0.0074
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.3857)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4281 0.1853 0.1458 0.0935 0.0526 0.0114
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.4394)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable -  Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0034 -0.0510 -0.0174 0.0305 0.0278 0.0325
(0.7177) (0.0001) (0.076) (0.0017) (0.0042) (0.0007)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0137 -0.0194 0.0090 -0.0001 -0.0079 0.0084
(0.0283) (0.0019) (0.1464) (0.9841) (0.1796) (0.1279)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7))f or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Continental
Dependent Variable = company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0179 -0.0116 -0.0199 -0.0182 0.0028 -0.0176
(0.0588) (0.2116) (0.0294) (0.0404) (0.7435) (0.0312)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3408 0.2351 0.1749 0.1156 0.0280 0.0186
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1698) (0.3551)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0142 -0.0676 -0.0280 0.0292 0.0249 0.0367
(0.1188) (0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0059) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0050 -0.0021 0.0021 0.0061 -0.0031 -0.0052
(0.232) (0.6135) (0.6069) (0.1231) (0.416) (0.1495)
Daimler Benz
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.2688 -0.1374 -0.0322 0.0005 0.0136 0.0106
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0039) (0.9645) (0.2129) (0.2908)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5133 0.1562 0.0546 0.0457 0.0171 0.0176
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.2462) (0.2174)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable - Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0172 -0.0511 -0.0330 0.0213 0.0182 0.0324
(0.1102) (0.0001) (0.0046) (0.065) (0.1093) (0.0032)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0065 -0.0249 0.0183 0.0033 0.0026 0.0019
(0.4305) (0.0039) (0.0338) (0.6971) (0.759) (0.8077)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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DT. Babcock
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0723 -0.0420 -0.0446 -0.0222 -0.0244 -0.0078
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0163) (0.0074) (0.3812)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3344 0.2298 0.1740 0.1181 0.0658 0.0572
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0076) (0.0194)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0133 -0.0649 -0.0229 0.0328 0.0213 0.0298
(0.1452) (0.0001) (0.012) (0.0003) (0.0172) (0.0008)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0058 -0.0024 0.0044 -0.0044 0.0002 -0.0019
(0.0985) (0.4876) (0.1975) (0.1881) (0.9585) (0.5528)
Degussa
Dependent Variable - Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0456 -0.0265 -0.0114 -0.0387 -0.0166 0.0014
(0.0001) (0.0036) (0.1939) (0.0001) (0.0496) (0.865)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.2770 0.1947 0.1297 0.1190 0.0652 0.0522
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.009)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0120 -0.0682 -0.0298 0.0212 0.0189 0.0301
(0.1799) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0167) (0.0318) (0.0006)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0018 -0.0009 0.0177 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0070
(0.6563) (0.8235) (0.0001) (0.9947) (0.9244) (0.0478)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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___________________________ Bayer
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.2313 -0.1485 -0.0995 -0.0371 -0.0125 -0.0091
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.2048) (0.3089)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5202 0.2242 0.1094 0.0860 0.0179 0.0065
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2158) (0.6434)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0108 -0.0614 -0.0278 0.0214 0.0098 0.0221
(0.2645) (0.0001) (0.0076) (0.0388) (0.3368) (0.0266)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0046 -0.0067 0.0117 0.0072 0.0140 0.0071
(0.5084) (0.352) (0.1057) (0.3119) (0.0458) (0.2606)_____
Hoechst
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.1954 -0.1500 -0.0541 -0.0329 -0.0169 -0.0016
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0696) (0.8547)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5487 0.2547 0.1182 0.0927 0.0462 0.0185
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0029) (0.2224)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0084 -0.0513 -0.0187 0.0276 0.0218 0.0375
(0.3638) (0.0001) (0.0594) (0.0052) (0.0262) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0080 -0.0234 0.0110 -0.0026 0.0009 -0.0042
(0.1798) (0.0001) (0.0709) (0.6651) (0.8837) (0.4395)
Regressions are as in Equations (7)and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Han AG
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0573 -0.0823 -0.0116 -0.0035 -0.0058 -0.0044
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1801) (0.6777) (0.4727) (0.5707)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
0.4289 0.2617 0.1670 0.1201 0.0521 -0.0086
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.627)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0095 -0.0612 -0.0247 0.0256 0.0138 0.0304
(0.2885) (0.0001) (0.0071) (0.0049) (0.1272) (0.0007)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0077 -0.0038 0.0053 0.0106 0.0041 -0.0053
(0.0955) (0.3959) (0.2207) (0.0119) (0.3166) (0.1753)
Henkel
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0907 -0.0521 -0.0407 -0.0194 -0.0067 -0.0054
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0291) (0.4414) (0.5121)
independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.2145 0.1666 0.1095 0.0811 0.0623 0.0064
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.6381)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable - Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0156 -0.0650 -0.0205 0.0266 0.0196 0.0296
(0.0884) (0.0001) (0.0261) (0.0034) (0.03) (0.0009)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0055 -0.0032 0.0134 -0.0007 0.0058 -0.0088
(0.3801) (0.5976) (0.0235) (0.9105) (0.3025) (0.1002)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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_________________________ Karstadt
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0361 -0.0471 -0.0254 -0.0418 -0.0003 -0.0122
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.9721) (0.1441)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.2843 0.1420 0.1142 0.0996 0.0576 0.0722
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0001)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0128 -0.0689 -0.0276 0.0273 0.0222 0.0314
(0.1594) (0.0001) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.013) (0.0004)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0010 -0.0001 0.0142 0.0009 0.0031 0.0129
(0.8449) (0.9768) (0.0025) (0.8511) (0.4913) (0.0027)
Linde
Dependent Variable - Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0755 -0.0738 -0.0455 -0.0365 -0.0326 -0.0100
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.2346)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.2541 0.1581 0.1083 0.0991 0.0617 0.0542
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0118 -0.0663 -0.0257 0.0260 0.0208 0.0331
(0.1956) (0.0001) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0214) (0.0002)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0005 -0.0069 0.0141 -0.0043 0.0019 -0.0024
(0.9307) (0.2159) (0.0094) (0.4202) (0.7212) (0.6244)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Mannesmann
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable - Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1590 -0.0975 -0.0405 -0.0225 0.0242 0.0131
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0173) (0.0094) (0.1349)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5666 0.2140 0.1194 0.0486 0.0079 -0.0211
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0042) (0.6414) (0.2051)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0096 -0.0642 -0.0316 0.0156 0.0091 0.0154
(0.3116) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.1134) (0.3547) (0.111)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0039 -0.0039 0.0145 0.0115 0.0161 0.0123
(0.4798) (0.4814) (0.0094) (0.0368) (0.0031) (0.0153)
Metallgesel1schaft
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0296 -0.0366 -0.0185 -0.0132 -0.0109 0.0093
(0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0341) (0.1258) (0.1953) (0.2507)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
0.3766 0.1576 0.1392 0.1424 0.1004 0.1051
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0175 -0.0665 -0.0297 0.0307 0.0183 0.0346
(0.0526) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0367) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0003 0.0033 -0.0007 -0.0013 0.0052 -0.0043
(0.9003) (0.212) (0.7907) (0.5978) (0.0353) (0.0745)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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__________________________Preussag
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0536 -0.0442 -0.0070 -0.0183 0.0086 -0.0224
<0.0001) (0.0001) (0.4259) (0.035) (0.313) (0.0061)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3761 0.1818 0.1136 0.0745 0.0459 0.0197
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0055) (0.2275)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0139 -0.0614 -0.0239 0.0302 0.0268 0.0377
(0.1208) (0.0001) (0.0088) (0.0008) (0.0027) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
0.0015 -0.0145 0.0101 -0.0102 -0.0022 -0.0027
(0.7584) (0.0031) (0.0349) (0.0306) (0.6279) (0.5427)
RWE
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1672 -0.1117 -0.0824 -0.0387 -0.0414 -0.0155
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0679)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4006 0.1790 0.1531 0.0773 0.0659 0.0350
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.005)
Dependent Variable - DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0079 -0.0610 -0.0259 0.0252 0.0179 0.0265
(0.395) (0.0001) (0.0079) (0.0092) (0.0624) (0.005)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0086 -0.0056 0.0100 -0.0008 0.0059 0.0010
(0.2397) (0.4477) (0.1713) (0.9129) (0.3966) (0.8713)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Schering
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.0293 -0.0472 -0.0281 -0.0175 -0.0059 -0.0099
(0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0015) (0.0428) (0.4892) (0.2041)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3857 0.1546 0.0641 0.0418 0.0046 0.0178
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0192) (0.7968) (0.3121)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0173 -0.0701 -0.0309 0.0299 0.0265 0.0364
(0.0537) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0086 0.0027 0.0043 -0.0102 -0.0022 -0.0001
(0.0591) (0.552) (0.3282) (0.0186) (0.6079) (0.9749)
Siemens
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.3353 -0.1933 -0.0765 -0.0234 -0.0009 0.0121
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0288) (0.93) (0.2025)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4747 0.2070 0.0838 0.0633 0.0186 0.0013
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1322) (0.9166)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0108 -0.0496 -0.0321 0.0238 0.0198 0.0290
(0.2843) (0.0001) (0.0037) (0.0299) (0.0659) (0.0052)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0026 -0.0268 0.0224 -0.0016 0.0035 0.0068
(0.7726) (0.0038) (0.0164) (0.8633) (0.6966) (0.4089)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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__________________________Thyasen
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1357 -0.1105 -0.0612 -0.0427 -0.0513 -0.0137
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1078)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5832 0.2597 0.1471 0.0385 0.0568 0.0500
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0318) (0.0014) (0.0044)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0109 -0.0646 -0.0314 0.0168 0.0179 0.0311
(0.2372) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0792) (0.0598) (0.0009)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
0.0030 -0.0053 0.0151 0.0070 -0.0051 0.0041
(0.5439) (0.2897) (0.0024) (0.1535) (0.291) (0.3636)
Veba
Dependent Variable = company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 
-0.1673 -0.1192 -0.0556 -0.0665 -0.0368 -0.0027
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.7553)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3862 0.1580 0.0817 0.0313 0.0491 0.0399
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dependent Variable - DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0153 -0.0596 -0.0314 0.0197 0.0166 0.0249
(0.109) (0.0001) (0.0022) (0.0532) (0.0993) (0.0115)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0046 -0.0201 0.0264 0.0067 0.0066 0.0090
(0.6217) (0.0348) (0.0054) (0.4723) (0.471) (0.2858)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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___________________________ Viag____
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0301 -0.0505 -0.0189 -0.0086 -0.0275 0.0056
(0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0368) (0.3364) (0.0016) (0.4981)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3465 0.1391 0.0893 0.0259 0.0388 -0.0033
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0853) (0.0096) (0.8229)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0176 -0.0684 -0.0289 0.0252 0.0210 0.0327
(0.0516) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0058) (0.021) (0.0003)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0101 0.0010 0.0068 -0.0051 -0.0025 0.0058
(0.0727) (0.8505) (0.2127) (0.3475) (0.6377) (0.2472)
Volkswagen
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.2243 -0.1195 -0.0456 0.0040 0.0398 0.0199
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.6886) (0.0001) (0.0303)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.6556 0.1831 0.0767 0.0345 -0.0112 -0.0291
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0565) (0.5323) (0.0973)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0068 -0.0516 -0.0248 0.0239 0.0080 0.0161
(0.499) (0.0001) (0.0203) (0.0237) (0.4442) (0.1161)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0090 -0.0153 0.0076 0.0038 0.0152 0.0119
(0.1252) (0.0102) (0.2021) (0.5139) (0.0089) (0.0267)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
90
Kaufhof Holding
Dependent Variable - Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0626 -0.0536 -0.0312 -0.0315 -0.0266 0.0027
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0023) (0.7454)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3830 0.2012 0.1249 0.1047 0.0730 0.0460
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0241)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0160 -0.0712 -0.0308 0.0232 0.0195 0.0294
(0.0793) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0108) (0.0312) (0.0011)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0043 0.0062 -0.0011 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0107
(0.2873) (0.1243) (0.7718) (0.574) (0.9754) (0.0037)
Bay. Hypobank
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1144 -0.0716 -0.0698 -0.0609 -0.0331 -0.0121
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1403)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3455 0.2022 0.1409 0.0975 0.0953 0.0445
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0177 -0.0731 -0.0372 0.0219 0.0227 0.0371
(0.0504) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0178) (0.0132) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0084 0.0033 0.0138 -0.0066 0.0062 -0.0038
(0.1771) (0.5916) (0.0232) (0.2758) (0.2899) (0.4895)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Bay. Vereinsbank
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0988 -0.0769 -0.0430 -0.0521 -0.0385 -0.0053
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.5155)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3153 0.1573 0.1084 0.0971 0.0685 0.0614
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0125 -0.0637 -0.0242 0.0287 0.0203 0.0350
(0.1635) (0.0001) (0.0081) (0.0016) (0.0241) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0006 -0.0164 0.0028 0.0086 0.0003 -0.0052
(0.9228) (0.0107) (0.656) (0.1663) (0.9579) (0.3581)
Commerzbank
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1780 -0.0999 -0.0430 -0.0049 -0.0200 0.0289
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.5944) (0.0254) (0.0005)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4072 0.1837 0.0997 0.0509 0.0532 0.0185
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1533)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0181 -0.0747 -0.0367 0.0216 0.0179 0.0253
(0.0479) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0226) (0.0568) (0.0062)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0148 0.0094 0.0145 -0.0002 0.0085 0.0086
(0.0253) (0.1592) (0.0283) (0.9796) (0.1844) (0.1484)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Deutsche Bank
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.3182 -0.1915 -0.1098 -0.0402 0.0002 -0.0084
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.9864) (0.3899)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4395 0.1693 0.1060 0.0664 0.0398 0.0249
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0181)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0041 -0.0384 -0.0231 0.0166 -0.0031 0.0282
(0.6968) (0.0008) (0.0464) (0.1512) (0.7871) (0.0103)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0343 -0.0333 0.0122 0.0193 0.0352 -0.0080
(0.0018) (0.0038) (0.2934) (0.0954) (0.0019) (0.4326)
Dresdner Bank
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable -  Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.2074 -0.1630 -0.0662 -0.0487 -0.0109 -0.0115
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2257) (0.1649)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.4323 0.2258 0.1491 0.1004 0.0593 0.0458
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0075 -0.0545 -0.0254 0.0237 0.0156 0.0252
(0.4136) (0.0001) (0.0084) (0.0133) (0.0991) (0.0069)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0225 -0.0112 0.0136 0.0053 0.0110 0.0106
(0.0012) (0.1103) (0.0524) (0.4404) (0.1036) (0.0867)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
(table con'd.)
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Lufthansa
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0402 -0.0183 -0.0221 -0.0342 -0.0223 0.0200
(0.0001) (0.0485) (0.0164) (0.0002) (0.0126) (0.0198)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5201 0.2189 0.1452 0.1636 -0.0217 0.0642
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.4537) (0.0251)
Dependent Variable = pax Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0159 -0.0659 -0.0253 0.0283 0.0218
0.0385
(0.0772) (0.0001) (0.0049) (0.0015) (0.0138) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0070 -0.0057 0.0007 -0.0029 0.0004 -0.0010
(0.0144) (0.0455) (0.813) (0.2916) (0.8878) (0.6979)
Allianz
Dependent Variable = Company Return
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.2281 -0.1675 -0.0857 -0.0619 -0.0111 -0.0179
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2359) (0.0364)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.5133 0.2222 0.1435 0.0986 0.0780 0.0576
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0032 -0.0464 -0.0284 0.0200 0.0146 0.0236
(0.7386) (0.0001) (0.0054) (0.0485) (0.1465) (0.0161)
Independent Variable = Lagged Company Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0173 -0.0216 0.0185 0.0054 0.0080 0.0097
(0.0104) (0.0015) (0.0064) (0.4248) (0.2204) (0.1067)
Regressions are as in Equations (7) and (8) where the dependent 
variable is either the individual company's returns (Equation 
(7)), or the DAX futures returns (Equation (8)). p-values are 
in parenthesis.
Table 7
Hypothesis Tests of Lead-Lag Between the 
Individual Securities Lead and the DAX Futures
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Firm Name
Futures Leads 
Security
Security Leads 
Futures
Allianz 260.127 (0.0001) 5.221 (0.0001)
BASF 233.392 (0.0001) 4.137 (0.0004)
Bayer 260.964 (0.0001) 1.498 (0.1744)
Bayrische Hypobank 156.556 (0.0001) 1.779 (0.0992)
BMW 170.918 (0.0001) 3.563 (0.0016)
Bayrische Vereinsbank 138.018 (0.0001) 1.707 (0.1150)
Commerzbank 190.800 (0.0001) 2.088 (0.0513)
Continental 76.446 (0.0001) 1.190 (0.3083)
Daimler 226.851 (0.0001) 3.351 (0.0027)
Deutsche Babcock 52.480 (0.0001) 1.192 (0.3070)
Deutsche Bank 327.222 (0.0001) 5.582 (0.0001)
Degussa 53.876 (0.0001) 4.365 (0.0002)
Dresdner Bank 254.857 (0.0001) 3.866 (0.0007)
Henkel 73.525 (0.0001) 1.768 (0.1013)
Hoechst 260.610 (0.0001) 3.931 (0.0006)
Karstadt 64.700 (0.0001) 3.050 (0.0056)
Kaufhof Holding 78.408 (0.0001) 1.970 (0.0662)
Lufthansa 66.328 (0.0001) 1.981 (0.0646)
Linde 73.793 (0.0001) 1.691 (0.1186)
MAN 135.911 (0.0001) 2.450 (0.0228)
Metallgesellschaft 37.523 (0.0001) 1.621 (0.1368)
Mannesmann 218.444 (0.0001) 3.717 (0.0011)
Preussag 107.705 (0.0001) 3.219 (0.0037)
RWE 215.337 (0.0001) 0.847 (0.5334)
Schering 87.132 (0.0001) 1.850 (0.0855)
Siemens 291.113 (0.0001) 3.886 (0.0007)
Thyssen 217.706 (0.0001) 2.628 (0.0151)
Veba 274.815 (0.0001) 2.745 (0.0115)
Viag 103.341 (0.0001) 1.205 (0.3004)
Volkswagen 247.362 (0.0001) 3.441 (0.0021)
Table-displays P-teat statistic ad p-values (in parenthesis).
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information is processed more quickly in the futures market 
than the markets for the individual securities. However, 
this data reveal a feedback of information processing 
between two stocks and the Futures market, Allianz and 
Deutsche Bank.
This second finding is extremely interesting given the 
fact that the majority of the other firms appear to have no 
impact, individually, on the futures market. Chan (1992) 
finds that none of the 20 MMI stocks exhibit this 
characteristic. Since these two companies hold large stock 
portfolios of many other German firms, this result possibly 
indicates that these firms may simply be proxies of the 
stock market as a whole. Essentially, it could be that 
Allianz and Deutsche Bank play the role of a widely 
diversified mutual fund of German equities.
On the other hand, given the fact that Allianz's and 
Deutsche Bank's weighted effect (the P*Q found in Equation 
(2)) on the DAX index is large (comprising approximately 
20% of the index), the result that these two firms lead the 
futures market could be an artifact of the way the DAX is 
calculated. However, Siemens's weight impact on the index 
is approximately 10%, and its stock returns do not appear 
to lead the futures market returns. The finding in this 
hypothesis test warrants additional attention.
In summary, testing Hypothesis #2 finds unidirectional 
information processing (with futures as the lead processor) 
for 28 of the 30 DAX component stocks. However, 2 of the
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stocks, Deutsche Bank and Allianz exhibit a feedback of 
information processing with the DAX futures market. That 
is, these two stocks Granger cause the futures market. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of a fixed lead-lag 
structure across all DAX component securities can be 
rejected in favor of its alternative.
2 .5.3 Hypothesis #3 Results 
Hypothesis #3 is stated as:
Ho: The lead-lag relation is the same in up and down 
markets.
Ha: The lead-lag relation is different in up and down 
markets.
The purpose of this hypothesis is to examine the 
effects of short-selling restrictions facing investors in 
the German equities market. Recall that short-selling 
individual securities in Germany is a difficult process for 
institutional investors and practically impossible for 
individual investors. Therefore, if investors have 
information that forecasts market downturns, their best 
opportunity to transact on that information is through the 
futures market, which has no short-selling restrictions.
Hence, down market related information portends two 
outcomes: (1) extending the lead time of futures 
information processing over spot market processing and, (2) 
unidirectional causation from the futures to the spot 
market. However, a priori, no forecast is made of the 
lead-lag relation in an up market.
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To test this hypothesis, intradaily DAX index returns 
are ranked into deciles. The lowest ranked decile contains 
the largest downward intradaily price movements, whereas 
the highest ranked decile contains the largest upward 
intradaily price movements. The lead-lag relationship in 
each decile is then examined via Equations (7) and (8).
Figures 11 and 12 portray a graphical representation 
of the regression relationship between DAX index returns, 
as the dependent variable, to itself lagged and to the 
futures returns lagged for observations in the lowest 
ranked decile of intradaily spot returns. Figure 11 
indicates that the parameter estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable become insignificant after 5 lags.
The surprising result of this hypothesis test is 
found in Figure 12, the graphical representation of the 
parameter estimates of the lagged futures returns. When 
the lead-lag relationship between all DAX indexes and the 
DAX index futures observations was examined in Hypothesis 
#1 , the result was that the futures series tended to lead 
the spot series by approximately 23 minutes. However, in a 
down market, the lead is truncated to no longer than 12 
minutes!
Given the fact that investors have a difficult, if not 
impossible, time short-selling German equities, this result 
is surprising. The F-statistic testing for Granger- 
Causality of the futures returns is significant (27.643, p-
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value < 0.0001), indicating that futures still Granger- 
cause index returns in a down market.
Explanations for this result may come from the 
following sources: (1) either the short-selling 
restrictions are not as restrictive as implied by Bamberg 
and Roder (1994), or (2) conservative German investors do 
not worry about selling securities they do not own, and 
substitute short-selling activities with selling their own 
positions, or (3) simply that investors react more quickly 
to extreme price movements than non-extreme price 
movements. Whatever, the reason, the decrease in the lead 
time of the futures market in a down market is surprising.
Figures 13 and 14 represent the results of the 
regression using futures data as the dependent variable. 
Figure 13 indicates that the lagged dependent parameter 
estimates become insignificant around lag 5, implying that 
the lag length is sufficient to reduce the incidence of 
autocorrelated errors. Figure 14 shows that the lagged DAX 
index return's parameter estimates become insignificant 
after 1 minute. Hence the lead from the spot market has 
decreased by l minute, as was found in testing Hypothesis 
#1.
The F-test statistic for Granger-Causality from the 
spot to futures markets is 8.259, which is also significant 
at the 0.0001 significance level. Since each return series
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leads the other, the feedback of information found in the 
test of Hypothesis #1 still holds, even in a down market. 
However, the information processing advantage exhibited by 
the futures market (up to 23 minutes) has decreased 
substantially in the down market dataset.
Figures 15 and 16 graphically represent the parameter 
estimates, and their 99.99% confidence limits for the case 
of the DAX Index returns as the dependent variable in the 
data containing the highest intradaily spot returns (the up 
market data series). Figure 15 indicates that the lagged 
dependent spot return parameters become insignificant 
quickly. Figure 16, however, presents the result that the 
lead of the futures market is trimmed even further in the 
up market than in the down market. Significant parameters
are only found to lag 5.
This result may provide some light on the unexpected 
outcome revealed in the down market analysis. For 
instance, suppose that extreme price movement markets 
reveal more information about the expectations of market 
participants than at other locations of the price change
distribution. If more information is revealed in these
extreme up and down markets, then the expectations of both 
spot market and futures market participants may become 
aligned, and therefore, their trading patterns may also 
become aligned.
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This additional information, coupled perhaps with 
investor sentiment, could cause spot market participants to 
transact quickly before prices become too low or too high. 
If the beneficial effects of leverage, lower transaction 
costs, etc... attributed to the futures market remain the 
same during extreme price movements, the relative 
advantages of trading through the futures market may be 
offset during periods of extreme price movements. Even 
though the absolute transactional advantages remain the 
same for the futures participants, the extreme price 
movements may create opportunities for spot market players 
to more easily recover higher transactions costs and 
possibly security selection and information gathering 
costs.
This explanation, however, is not meant to be 
rigorous, only cursory. The results of testing Hypothesis 
#3 are unique in that Chan (1992), does not document this 
effect in the U.S. markets. Essentially, his results 
indicate a constant lead-lag relationship in both up and 
down markets. His work does not show a decrease in the 
futures lead position. The results point to the fact that 
information processing in extreme markets may be different 
than at other times. Additional investigation of this 
phenomenon is warranted.
Figures 17 and 18 indicate that the information 
processing effects on the futures market are the same in up 
and down markets (compare to Figures 13 and 14). Their
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presentation is made for completeness only. The 
statistical test for causality generates a value of 8.259 
(p-value < 0.0001) for futures causing spot returns, and 
6.769 (p-value < 0.0001) for the spot returns causing 
futures price changes. Thus, the feedback of information 
is also present in the up market data.
In summary, the results related to Hypothesis Test #3 
indicate that the null cannot be rejected. Both the up and 
down markets appear to generate a significant feedback of 
information processing between the spot and futures 
markets. Given the short-selling restrictions found in 
Germany, this result was unexpected. It is conjectured 
that the extreme price change distributions cause the 
expectations of both spot and futures participants to 
become more closely aligned, which manifests the feedback 
relationship. No support is found here for short-selling 
restrictions to cause the futures market additional 
information processing advantages.
2.5.4 Hypothesis #4 Results
The null and alternative hypotheses for Hypothesis #4 
are:
Ho: The lead-lag relation is similar under different 
trading activity.
Ha: The lead-lag relation is different under different 
trading activity.
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The herding hypotheses of Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1988), Bhushan (1991) and Chowdry and Nanda (1991) 
indicate that uninformed investors "herd" together in order 
to protect themselves from being "fleeced" by informed 
investors. The suggestion from these papers is that 
uninformed investors will want to trade together during 
time of day, trade similar securities or trade in the same 
market.
Hypothesis #4 is a test of the herding notions through 
analyzing the lead-lag relationship for different levels of 
trading activity. Three proxies for trading activity are 
presented: the number of firms trading per time interval, 
total number of transactions per time interval, and total 
volume of shares traded per time interval. Since the data 
are dependent on the security-specific dataset, five minute 
returns for the DAX index and DAX index futures data are 
generated and used for the analysis.
A parallel to the herding notion is found in Easley 
and O'Hara (1987) where it is stated that informed 
investors will want to trade their information quickly and 
in as large amounts as possible, so that the market impacts 
are minimized. To test whether Easley and O'Hara's (1987) 
trading activity proxy has an effect on the lead-lag 
relationship an average volume per transaction variable is 
created. This variable is calculated as the total volume 
traded in a five minute interval divided by the total 
number of transactions occurring in that interval.
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Each one of these proxies is calculated per five 
minute time period and then ranked intradaily into 
quintiles.30 The lowest and highest intradaily quintile 
rankings for each proxy are then used to examine the lead- 
lag relation between the spot and futures markets. The 
results of the examination of a differential lead-lag 
structure for each trading activity proxy are found in 
Tables 8 through 11.
The regression results found in Table 8 can be 
summarized as follows. For the lowest activity data 
series, the futures leads the spot by only 5 minutes. The 
F-test for Granger Causality from the futures to the spot 
is 29.553 and is significant at the 0.0001 level. There is 
no discernable pattern of the lagged spot returns in the 
DAX futures regression. The F-test for causality from the 
spot to the futures is 2.138 (p-value = 0.0464), which is 
insignificant at the prescribed level required in this 
dissertation. Therefore, the direction of causality in the 
lowest trading activity quintile, proxied by the number of 
firms trading in a 5 minute time period, is unidirectional 
from the futures to the spot.
For the highest activity data series, the lead of the 
futures over the spot increases from 5 to 20 minutes. The 
causality test yields a value of 156.419 (p-value <
0 .0001), indicating causality from the futures to the spot.
30Quintiles are used since the volume information is 
only present for the last 10 months of the dataset.
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However, the lagged DAX index returns have a significant 
parameter at five minutes in the DAX futures regression.
The Granger test yields a value of 9.131, which is 
significant at the 0.0001 level. This result indicates a 
feedback relationship between the spot and futures market 
existing in the high trading activity data series.
Therefore, when using the number of firms traded as a 
proxy for trading activity, the null of Hypothesis #3 is 
rejected in favor of its alternative.
The results found in Table 9, where trading activity 
is defined as the total number of security transactions in 
a 5 minute period, are as follows. Quintile 1 (the lowest 
activity series) indicates that futures price changes lead 
spot price changes by approximately 10 minutes. The 
causality test yields 39.891 (significant at 0.0001) 
indicating a causal relationship from the futures market to 
the spot market when market participants are confronted 
with low trading activity.
None of the lagged spot market return parameters are 
individually significant in the futures regression. The 
joint hypothesis testing the significance of all the lagged 
spot return parameters simultaneously generates a test 
statistic of 2.374 (p-value = 0.0274), which does not meet 
the significance level criteria of 0.0001. Therefore, in 
low trading activity, defined by the number of transactions 
per 5 minute time period, the direction of causation is 
unidirectional from the futures to the spot market.
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Table 8
Examination of the Lead-Lag Relationship 
Under Different Trading Activity: 
Proxy - Number of Firms Trading in 5 Minute Period
Quintile 1 (Lowest Activity)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0232 -0.0651 -0.0282 -0.0253 -0.0053 -0.0171
(0.138) (0.0001) (0.0462) (0.0815) (0.6996) (0.0992)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0194 0.0054 0.0056 0.0028 0.0037 0.0025
(0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0807) (0.0224) (0.0805)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.2604 -0.1257 -0.0434 -0.0341 0.0271
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.1084) (0.2365) (0.3434)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.5241 -0.5878 0.2969 -0.0738 0.0205
(0.0583) (0.0272) (0.2365) (0.7745) (0.933)
Lag 6
0.0214
(0.3966)
Lag 6
0.1263
(0.4924)
Quintile 5 (Highest Activity)
Dependent Variable - DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.4339 -0.3716 -0.1967 -0.2039 -0.1490
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Independent Variable - Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.1032 0.0563 0.0323 0.0324 0.0255
(0 .0 0 0 1) (0 .0 0 0 1) (0 .0 0 0 1) (0 .0001) (0 .0 0 0 1)
Lag 6
-0.0140
(0.6477)
Lag 6
0.0130
(0.0031)
Dependent Variable - DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.1981 0.1453 -0.0272 0.1429 0.1453
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.5309) (0.0016) (0.0005)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-2.1715 -0.6758 0.1628 -1.1428 -0.7071
(0.0001) (0.0578) (0.6685) (0.0019) (0.0472)
Lag 6 
0.0723 
(0.0561)
Lag 6
-0.0509
(0.8476)
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Table 9
Examination of the Lead-Lag Relationship 
Under Different Trading Activity:
Proxy - Total Security Transactions in 5 Minute Period
Quintile 1 (Lowest Activity)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.0282 -0.0781 -0.0219 -0.0507 -0.0072
(0.0692) (0.0001) (0.1242) (0.0006) (0.6049)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.0226 0.0091 0.0055 0.0045 0.0032
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0052) (0.0481)
Lag 6 
-0.0099 
(0.3356)
Lag 6 
0.0017 
(0.2551)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.2650 -0.1324 -0.0520 -0.0257 0.0262
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0725) (0.3554) (0.3477)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.2422 -0.6066 0.1634 -0.5235 0.2095
(0.3639) (0.0159) (0.5045) (0.0386) (0.3837)
Lag 6 
0.0166 
(0.5057)
Lag 6 
0.1007 
(0.5685)
Quintile 5 (Highest Activity)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.4665 -0.3841 -0.1431 -0.1569 -0.1467
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.1097 0.0623 0.0276 0.0308 0.0248
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Lag 6 
-0.0195 
(0.5095)
Lag 6 
0.0151 
(0.0005)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.2801 0.1948 -0.0532 0.1375 0.1063
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.2603) (0.0041) (0.0167)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-2.4819 -0.5986 0.6472 -0.5566 -0.4979
(0.0001) (0.1383) (0.1123) (0.1505) (0.2008)
Lag 6 
0.0738 
(0.0643)
Lag 6
0.0336
(0.902)
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The lead time of the futures market in high activity 
periods increases from 5 to at least 25 minutes. The 
causal test statistic is still significant (F-statistic = 
181.12, p-value < 0.0001), indicating causation from the 
futures market to the spot. However, there also appears to 
be causation from the spot market to the futures market.
The F-test in this case is 9.578 with an associated p-value 
of < 0.0001. Hence a feedback of information appears to 
exist when high trading activity is defined as the total 
number of security transactions in a 5 minute time period.
The accept/reject decision for this proxy of trading 
activity is to reject the null in favor of its alternative. 
This result is distinctive because Chan (1992) does not 
find a difference of information processing using this 
trading activity proxy in the U.S. markets. There appears 
to be a differential level of information processing in 
high trading activity time periods in Germany's securities 
markets.
Table 10 presents the results of the lead-lag 
examination when trading activity is defined as total 
volume traded per 5 minute interval. The results for this 
trading activity proxy are different than the previous two 
proxies of trading activity.
For instance, there is only unidirectional causality 
from the futures to the spot when trading activity is 
defined as volume. The causality test shows low and high
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Table 10
Examination of the Lead-Lag Relationship 
Under Different Trading Activity: 
Proxy - Total Volume in 5 Minute Period
Quintile 1 (Lowest Activity)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return_____________________
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.2154 -0.1868 -0.1100 -0.0507 -0.0390 -0.0521
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0664) (0.1006) (0.0045)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0343 0.0231 0.0158 0.0102 0.0034 0.0041
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.2405) (0.0981)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.2338 -0.0857 -0.0220 -0.0244 0.0071
(0.0001) (0.0581) (0.6144) (0.5678) (0.8673)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.2392 -0.7873 -0.4016 -0.0579 -0.4849
(0.5562) (0.0493) (0.2903) (0.8852) (0.1598)
Quintile 5 (Highest Activity)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.1337 -0.2740 -0.0320 -0.1502 -0.1465
(0.0217) (0.0001) (0.6274) (0.0166) (0.0147)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.0853 0.0514 0.0232 0.0263 0.0156
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0231)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return___________________
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.1614 0.1615 -0.0242 0.1253 0.0362 0.1083
(0.0005) (0.0083) (0.7164) (0.0766) (0.5721) (0.0552)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.1531 -0.9892 1.3878 -0.4300 -0.4261 -0.2028
(0.7782) (0.0851) (0.0242) (0.4623) (0.4469) (0.6348)
Lag 6 
0.0204 
(0.6556)
Lag 6 
0.0150 
(0.0131)
Lag 6 
-0.0130 
(0.72)
Lag 6 
0.1506 
(0.5708)
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activity quintiles to be 30.426 and 51.627 respectively. 
Both test statistics pass the significance level criteria. 
Testing causation from the spot to the futures market 
results in insignificant test statistics under both trading 
activity quintiles, 1.188 (p-value = 0.31) and 2.134 (p- 
value = 0.0437), the low and high trading activity 
quintiles respectively.
Therefore, when trading activity is defined to be 
volume, the lead-lag relationship is the same under high 
and low trading activity levels. Unidirectional causation 
from the futures market to the spot market is indicated in 
both scenarios. Therefore, the null for Hypothesis #4 
cannot be rejected when using this proxy for trading 
activity.
The result from Germany is important because Chan 
(1992) does not examine volume's relationship to the lead- 
lag structure in the U.S. market. Essentially, trading 
volume may be helpful in explaining the longer lead time of 
the futures market. The volume/lead-lag relationship 
should be examined in more detail.
The final proxy for examining trading activity relates 
to Easley and O'Hara's (1987) average volume per 
transaction variable. The results using this proxy for 
trading activity are found in Table 11 and are 
qualitatively similar to those found in Table 10. The 
futures market Granger causes the spot market in both 
quintiles of trading activity. The F-statistics are
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Table 11
Examination of the Lead-Lag Relationship 
Under Different Trading Activity:
Proxy - Average Volume Per Transaction in 5 Minute Period
Quintile 1 (Lowest Activity)
Dependent Variable = PAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.3765 -0.3369 -0.2083 -0.1074 -0.1438
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0,0012) (0.0001)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.0474 0.0353 0.0265 0.0158 0.0082
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0212)
Lag 6 
-0.0954 
(0.0001)
Lag 6 
0.0107 
(0.0005)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.1812 -0.0410 -0.0051 -0.0280 -0.0280
(0.0001) (0.3611) (0.9093) (0.5397) (0.5126)
Lag 6
-0.0296
(0.4234)
Lag 6 
-0.2246 
(0.4004)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
-0.9513 -0.9309 -0.5202 -0.1450 -0.7271
(0.0129) (0.0172) (0.1975) (0.7165) (0.0329)__________
__________________ Quintile 5 (Highest Activity)____________
Dependent Variable - DAX Index Return_____________________
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0238 -0.0479 0.0166 -0.0585 0.0575 0.0389
(0.6224) (0.3265) (0.7617) (0.2667) (0.2391) (0.3191)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0618 0.0231 0.0168 0.0118 0.0034 0.0054
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0036) (0.0532) (0.557) (0.2688)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return___________________
Independent Variable -  Lagged DAX Futures Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.0578 -0.0119 -0.0197 0.0876 0.0033
(0.1909) (0.8254) (0.735) (0.1568) (0.9553)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5
0.3327 -0.1582 0.6327 -0.2948 0.9286
(0.4969) (0.7492) (0.2536) (0.5809) (0.0608)
Lag 6 
0.0884 
(0.0761)
Lag 6
0.0697
(0.8601)
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statistically significant. Their values are 42.155 and 
34.106 for the low and high trading activity quintiles.
The test for spot to futures causality does not reject 
the null of zero parameters in each category. Test 
statistics are 2.166 (p-value = 0.0441) for the low trading 
activity quintile and 1.074 (p-value = 0.3762) for the high 
trading activity quintile.
This analysis indicates that the unidirectional causal 
relation is the same in low and high trading activity 
quintiles when using average volume per transaction as the 
proxy for trading activity. Therefore, the null of 
Hypothesis #4 cannot be rejected when using this proxy.
In summary, when trading activity is defined as number 
of firms trading per period, or total transactions 
occurring per period of time, the null of Hypothesis #4 is 
rejected. That is, a differential lead-lag structure 
exists under different trading activities. However, when 
volume is used as the proxy for trading activity, either 
total volume or average volume per transaction, the null of 
Hypothesis #4 cannot be rejected.
This result is interesting because it implies that the 
proxy for trading activity is sensitive to which variables 
are used. If trading activity is a proxy for the amount of 
information available in securities markets, research by
I
Lamoureaux and Lastrapes (1990) indicates that volume is 
the proxy for information. However, Harris (1987)
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indicates that the number of transactions is the better 
proxy.
The results of this hypothesis test are useful because 
they indicate that differential information characteristics 
may be attributed to both of these measures. The debate 
should not be focused on whether information is proxied by 
volume or number of transactions, but rather, what type of 
information is contained in each variable. For instance, 
does volume proxy for an informed investor's transactions? 
Do the number of securities transacted proxy for a noise 
trader's transactions? These are issues that should be 
addressed in subsequent research.
2.5.5 Hypothesis #5 Results
Ho: The lead-lag relation between the spot and futures 
markets is the same under heavy market-wide price 
movements as it is under security specific price 
movements.
Ha: The lead-lag relation between the spot and futures 
markets is different under heavy market-wide price 
movements as it is under security specific price 
movements.
This hypothesis examines the issue of which market 
investors choose to transact with market-wide (macro 
related) or security-specific (micro related) information. 
Essentially, the idea is that macro economic information 
affects the whole economy: hence, to leverage its impact, 
traders prefer to transact in the futures market, where 
transactions costs are low in comparison to the spot 
market. This notion portends that market-wide information
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enhances the futures information processing speed over that 
of the spot market.
On the other hand, if investors have information 
related to individual companies, or sub-groups of 
companies, they may prefer to transact through the equity 
as opposed to derivative markets. Therefore, if the 
information tends to be security-specific, the lead of 
information processing attributed to the futures market 
should be decreased. Table 12 presents the results of 
examining this hypothesis.
Quintile 1, in Table 12, presents results for the data 
series of lowest market-wide movements. The contrapositive 
definition of the lowest market-wide quintile is the 
highest security-specific related quintile. That is, the 
data used in this quintile contain the highest level of 
security-specific information.
The regression results indicate that the futures 
market leads the spot market by only 15 minutes for the 
security-specific data series. The Granger causality tests 
indicate that lagged futures price changes cause spot price 
changes (test statistic is 13.771, p-value < 0.0001), and 
that lagged spot price changes cause futures price changes 
(test statistic is 3.725, p-value < 0.0001). Therefore, 
there appears to be a feedback of information processing 
present in low levels of macro-economic related 
information.
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Table 12
Examination of the Lead-Lag Relationship 
Under Different Market-Wide Movements:
Proxy - Number of Firms Moving Together in 5 Minute Period
Quintile 1 (Lowest Market-Wide Movements)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.0414 -0.0810 -0.0357 -0.0383 -0.0094 -0.0180
(0.0024) (0.0001) (0.0035) (0.0014) (0.3921) (0.0344)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.0107 0.0048 0.0053 0.0040 0.0009 0.0027
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0037) (0.5229) (0.0202)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.3762 -0.2227 -0.1262 -0.0872 -0.0293 -0.0145
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.2658) (0.5282)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.7533 0.1170 0.8895 -0.0035 0.4534 -0.0674
(0.0052) (0.6415) (0.0002) (0.9882) (0.0368) (0.6875)
Quintile 5 (Highest Market-Wide Movements)
Dependent Variable = DAX Index Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-0.2434 -0.2975 -0.1003 -0.1833 -0.1173 0.0316
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0336) (0.0001) (0.011) (0.3621)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.1140 0.0559 0.0283 0.0300 0.0228 0.0073
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.116)
Dependent Variable = DAX Futures Return
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Futures Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
0.3297 0.1571 -0.0512 0.1490 0.0912 0.0286
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.2676) (0.0015) (0.0464) (0.4879)
Independent Variable = Lagged DAX Index Return
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6
-1.0917 -0.2978 0.8533 -0.8481 -0.6308 0.5230
(0.0035) (0.4572) (0.0402) (0.0334) (0.1207) (0.0872)
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Quintile 5 contains data corresponding to the largest 
levels of market-wide information. The regression results 
indicate that the futures market now processes information 
25 minutes before the spot market. This is consistent with 
the notion that investors want to trade through the 
derivative market when their information is related to the 
macro economy. Testing the causal relation from the 
futures to the spot market results in a test statistic of 
187.397, which is significant at the 0.0001 level. Testing 
the causal relation from the spot to the futures market 
yields a test statistic of 4.482. Even though its 
significance level is close to the cutoff, p-value =
0.0002, it does not meet the significance levels required 
in this study. Therefore, a unidirectional causation 
relation holds from the futures market to the spot in 
periods of market-wide information.
Since the results of this hypothesis test indicate a 
feedback of information when market-wide price movements 
are low, and a unidirectional lead of information 
processing when market-wide price movements are high, the 
null of this hypothesis test is rejected in favor of its 
alternative. This result was found by Chan (1992) in the 
U.S. markets and adds support to the idea that derivative 
securities provide an alternative avenue for price 
discovery. Due to their lower costs, and leverage effects, 
informed investors, especially when they hold macro­
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economic related information, will transmit the information 
through the derivative, as opposed to the underlying 
security.
2.6 CHAPTER 2 SUMMARY
The existence of faster information processing by 
derivative securities is well documented in the financial 
economics literature. Since, theoretically, derivative 
security prices are based on information impounded in the 
underlying asset, this phenomenon is puzzling.
The thrust of Chapter 2 is to examine the price 
discovery issue by examining possible explanations for this 
phenomenon through the use of data found in Germany's 
security markets. Using data from Germany is useful 
because examining price discovery mechanisms in another 
market offers an opportunity to test the robustness of 
ideas formulated to explain the deriviative security lead- 
lag phenomena observed in the United States.
In order to examine the factors affecting the 
information processing advantage attributed to derivative 
securities in general, and stock index futures in 
particular, a number of hypotheses are formulated. These 
hypotheses can be summarized as: (1) documenting a lead-lag 
relationship in the DAX stock index and DAX stock index 
futures markets, (2) examining the lead-lag relationship 
between the DAX component stocks and the DAX futures 
market, (3) testing whether short-selling restrictions 
impact the lead-lag relationship, (4) evaluating trading
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activity proxies and the effects on the lead-lag 
relationship, and finally, (5) weighing the influence of 
macro- or micro-based economic information on the lead-lag 
structure. The results of these hypothesis tests are as 
follows.
First, there exists a significant feedback of 
information processing between the DAX spot and DAX futures 
markets. Even though the lead time of the futures return 
series is much longer than that found in Grunbichler, 
Longstaff, and Schwartz (1994), Granger causality from the 
spot to futures market is also documented. Therefore, on 
occasion, information in the spot market hits the spot 
market first and then is transmitted to the futures market.
The examination of the lead-lag relationship between 
the futures market and each DAX component stock yields an 
interesting result. Most (28/30) of the component stock's 
return series are Granger caused by the futures market. 
However, two stocks, Allianz and Deutsche Bank exhibit a 
significant feedback of information relationship with the 
futures market. That is, at times, the price changes in 
these two stocks lead the price changes in the futures 
market. The reason for this result could be that these 
securities are themselves market proxies, or just an 
artifact from the way these two stocks affect the 
calculation of the DAX index. Given the evidence (of no 
MMI component stock leading the MMI index) established in
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the U.S. market by Chan (1992), this finding is surprising 
and deserves more in-depth study.
Short-selling restrictions are especially onerous in 
Germany. These restrictions suggest that the lead-lag 
structure may be altered, especially when security prices 
are declining. Therefore, examining the lead-lag 
relationship in extreme up- and down-markets may offer 
additional insight into explaining the price discovery 
advantage attributed to derivative securities.
The surprising result in evaluating the short-selling 
restriction hypothesis is not that short-selling 
restrictions do not appear to affect the lead-lag 
structure, because a feedback relationship exists in both 
markets, but that the lead time of the futures price 
changes decreases drastically (from 23 to 15 minutes in a 
down market and 23 to 5 minutes in an up-market). An 
alignment of investor expectations during extreme price 
movements is used to explain this surprising result.
The trading activity hypothesis test results are 
multi-faceted since different proxies of trading activity 
are defined. Whenever a transactional based variable 
(number of transactions, or number of firms traded) is 
used, the lead-lag relationship changes with low to high 
levels of trading activity. However, when a volume based 
variable (total of average volume) is used, the lead-lag 
relationship remains unchanged with changes in trading 
activity.
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This result implies that the trading activity variable 
chosen is a proxy for different types of information.
Given the fact that efficient capital markets suggest that 
all relevant information is impounded in prices, the 
results of these hypothesis tests support additional 
research into ascertaining which market factors are proxies 
for information. Establishing what factors proxy for 
information and how these factors are used by market 
participants would be a worthwhile endeavor.
Examining the impact of macro- or micro-economic 
information on the lead-lag relationship can add support to 
the notion that the observed price discovery process in 
derivative securities markets is due to lower transactions 
costs and increased leverage opportunities. The macro- 
economic explanation is supported here because the results 
imply that the lead-lag structure changes from a feedback 
of information in security-specific defined markets, to a 
unidirectional lead in market-wide defined markets. The 
implications are that investors use derivative assets as 
their vehicle to disseminate macro based economic 
information because of lower transactions costs and 
leverage effects.
Through the use of a different dataset and method of 
analysis than appears in previous work, this research 
provides information related to the price discovery 
processes in Germany's securities markets. In particular, 
information is provided that helps explain the often
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observed phenomenon that price discovery in derivative 
securities is faster than their underlying assets.
The results of this study indicate that the DAX 
futures market often processes information more quickly 
than the DAX spot market, but this advantage does not hold 
in all circumstances. Essentially, the processing speed is 
dependent on the market conditions confronting investment 
participants. Market-wide information tends to increase 
the lead time, but extreme price movements tend to decrease 
the lead time. However, in a majority of the cases, a 
feedback of information exists between the 2 markets. This 
implies that Germany's securities participants use a wide 
range of information when making investment decisions, and 
that this information set is useful in discovering the 
correct price for assets.
CHAPTER 3 
EXTREME VALUE
3.1 OBJECTIVE
Futures market officials are confronted with the 
difficult task of setting appropriate margin levels that 
must balance the costs of trader default and the benefits 
of increased market liquidity. One way to guard against 
default is prudent margin setting practices designed to 
protect futures positions from extreme price movements.
The objective of this chapter is to concentrate on 
protecting against margin violation via accurately 
extrapolating the probabilities of encountering extreme 
price movements. This chapter suggests that using extreme 
value theory is the preferred tool to use in setting 
prudent margin levels.
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.2.1 Extreme Values31
According to Gumbel (1958) and Kinnison (1985), the 
impetus for research on extreme value statistics originated 
from early astronomers. Like most researchers, astronomers 
were having a difficult time handling outlying 
observations. The difficulty arose from the fact that the 
tools provided by Gaussian probability and statistical 
theory were mainly concerned with calculating measurements
31The first two paragraphs of this section rely heavily 
on Gumbel's (1958) and Kinnison's (1985) exposition on the 
history of extreme value research.
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for averages, not extreme observations. Hence, the well- 
known rule-of-thumb "if it's plus or minus three standard 
deviations away from the mean, throw it out" was created.
A conundrum arises, however, if the underlying distribution 
has infinite sample size (as in the case of asymptotic 
distributions). The magnitude and frequency of outliers 
increases because there is greater opportunity for them to 
occur.
The main problem with trying to quantify extreme value 
probabilities is that large values are actually new random 
variables with distributional properties different from the 
parent distribution. This observation was made by 
Bortkiewicz (1922), the individual credited with being the 
first to clearly state the extreme value problem.
In order to generate reliable statistical tools that 
address large values, a new tractable theory had to be 
developed. Fisher and Tippet (1928) determined the three 
asymptotic distributions that accurately describe extreme 
value behavior of all other distributional forms. Their 
work independently replicated the asymptotic distribution 
result of Frechet (1927) and added two additional 
asymptotic distributions to the literature.
Essentially, their distributions provided tractable 
solutions for determining the extreme value behavior of all 
data generation processes. Further applications and 
refinements of extreme value theory were then made in the
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statistical inference literature by Gumbel (1941), Gnedenko 
(1943), and Jenkinson (1955) .32
Arriving at the three different extreme value 
distributional forms is as follows.33 Consider a sequence 
of stationary i.i.d. random variables X„ X2, • Xn with 
some probability density function F. The statistic of 
interest is determining the probability that the maximum
ftfn=max(Xx,X2, ... ,Xn) (22)
value of the first n variables is below a certain level x, 
where the cumulative probability distribution is stated as
bein9' PiMnZx}=Fn(x) . (23)
Extreme value theory boils down to studying the asymptotic 
distribution of the scaled order statistic Mn.
32Three textbooks that summarize and expand extreme 
value theory and its applications are Gumbel (1958), 
Galambos (1978), and Leadbetter, Lindgren and Rootzen 
(1983). Galambos (1978) lists a number of non-financial 
cases where extreme value analysis is valuable. For 
example, engineering designs of dams, dikes and other 
structures can be modified to account for extreme weather 
conditions such as hurricanes or floods. Other examples 
include failure of components in equipment, corrosion 
effects on the failure of structures, or extreme levels of 
pollutants and their effects on the inhabitants in a 
particular environment.
33This description is an annotation of what can be 
found in most of the extreme value references mentioned in 
this section. Extreme value research found in the 
statistical inference literature basically states the 
problem in the same way as that found here and in papers 
applying extreme value concepts to financial data by Jansen 
and deVries (1991), Koedijk, Stork and deVries (1992), 
Kofman and deVries (1989), and Kofman (1993).
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Extreme value research depends on finding an 
appropriate situation where the following is satisfied:
Piatt(Mn-bn) <:*} Z G{x) 
or in terms of F; (24)
F n(x/an+bn) *G(x).
In other words, the probability that an appropriately 
scaled maximum value is less than or equal to some value of 
interest (x) is given by the function G(x) . G(x) is one of 
the three distributional forms determined by Fisher and 
Tippet (1928) and w means "to weakly converge." If there 
is a situation that satisfies (24), then F belongs to the 
domain of attraction of G, which takes the following three 
forms:
Type I: G{x) = exp{-e~x) if -*><x<<*>;
Type II: G{x) = 0 if xzO,
= exp(-x'“) if x>0; (25)
Type III: G(x) = exp(-(-x)“) if x<0,
=1 if x^O.
The double exponential form of the Type I distribution 
represents cases where the tail of the underlying 
distribution is approaching its asymptote exponentially. 
This situation is representative of the tail behavior of 
the normal distribution. However, Type II distributions 
represent cases where the tail of the underlying 
distribution does not decay rapidly at an appreciable rate. 
Type II generated data are indicative of cases where second 
or higher moments do not exist, such as observations 
generated by distributions with "fat" tails. Finally, the
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Type III limiting result contains an upper bound and 
represents extreme value behavior from truncated data 
generation processes. Since there are numerous studies 
indicating that fat tailed distributions, and not the 
normal distribution, generate financial asset returns, the 
underlying assumption in most financial research employing 
extreme value theory is that extreme asset returns exhibit 
Type II limiting behavior.34
3.2.2 Parallels with Stable Paretian research
Even though extreme value theory is documented 
thoroughly in the statistical inference literature, 
applications to financial market data are less numerous. 
Stable Paretian related research, however, which takes tail 
parameters into account, and thus extreme observations, is 
more common. This section reviews the extant literature on 
stable Paretian research and its relation to extreme value 
concepts.
Fama (1965) develops a portfolio optimization model 
using Paretian distributions. However, his analysis 
concentrates on the dispersion parameter of the entire 
distribution, not specifically the extreme values. Fama 
(1965) concludes that even when asset return distributions
mA brief listing of the studies documenting non­
normality for asset returns is Mandlebrot (1963), Fama 
(1965), Frankfurter and Lamoureaux (1987), and Akgiray and 
Booth (1988). Examples of studies assuming the Type II 
limiting behavior are Jansen and deVries (1991), Koedijk, 
Stork and deVries (1992), Kofman (1993), and Kofman and 
deVries (1989).
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contain infinite variances, there is a diversification 
benefit similar to the well-known Markowitz (1952) result. 
That is, even though the portfolio variance is not reduced, 
because it is infinite in Paretian distributions, the 
magnitude of the dispersion parameter, from the stable 
distribution, is reduced by holding a diversified 
portfolio.
Frankfurter and Lamoureaux (1987) examine Fama's 
(1965) hypothesis and conclude that even though asset 
return distributions are not strictly normal, assumption of 
a Gaussian distribution is preferable to Paretian 
distributions in normative portfolio theory models. The 
preference of assuming a normal distribution follows from 
the fact that simulations of ex-post portfolio returns 
assuming Paretian distributions never outperform the ex­
post portfolio returns generated by a normal distribution. 
Since the Paretian hypothesis is more difficult to employ, 
Frankfurter and Lamoureaux (1987) conclude "it is of no use 
to a portfolio manager— given extant estimation 
techniques."
Akgiray and Booth (1988) use stable Paretian 
distributions in their analysis of U.S. traded stocks and 
find that most of the stocks do not strictly conform to 
stable law distribution properties. The data in their 
sample exhibit tail properties significantly thinner than 
those expected from a Paretian distribution. Additionally, 
Akgiray, Booth, and Loistl (1989a, 1989b) show that
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Paretian distributions do not accurately describe returns 
on German securities. Here too, German stock returns 
exhibit thinner tail behavior than that expected from a 
Paretian distribution. These two papers show that while 
the tail parameters of some securities indicate a Paretian 
distribution, the other descriptive parameters are not 
stable with respect to time. Hence, there is a preference 
for using finite variance models over using stable Paretian 
models.
Loretan and Phillips (1994) also examine stable 
Paretian distributions using a variety of heavy-tailed 
financial time series. Their emphasis is on tests of 
covariance stationarity, not specifically the stable 
Paretian distributional properties. They also provide 
evidence of data containing finite variances, but high 
probabilities of achieving observations in the tails of 
each distribution.
The literature cited so far indicates that financial 
time-series data do not strictly conform to stable Paretian 
laws. However, the existence of high levels of extreme 
observations is still problematic. Therefore, how does one 
account for these extreme observations? Extreme value 
analysis may be helpful in understanding the 
distributional properties of these outlying financial time- 
series data.
Akgiray, Booth, and Seifert (1988) apply extreme value 
concepts in a generalized Pareto context when examining
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black-market exchange rates. Specifically, they employ 
DuMouchel's (1983) maximum likelihood technique to estimate 
the tail parameter of the black market exchange rate 
distribution and find that this particular set of financial 
data exhibit infinite variances. This result contrasts the 
findings of Akgiray and Booth (1988), Akgiray, Booth, and 
Loistl (1989a, 1989b) and Loretan and Phillips (1994).
Koedijk, Stork and DeVries (1992) apply a non- 
parametric index calculation, as found in Hill (1975), to 
examine differences between exchange rate regimes. They 
find that the non-parametric estimator is more efficient 
than the maximum likelihood estimator employed by Akgiray, 
Booth, and Seifert (1988) and that their data do not 
exhibit Paretian properties during floating exchange rate 
regimes.
Jansen and DeVries (1991) also employ Hill's estimator 
to extreme price movement data in the U.S. stock market. 
Their result generates realistic probabilities for 
anticipating an abrupt market downturn, such as the one 
occurring in 1987. Similar to the results of Mandlebrot 
(1963) and Fama (1965), their tail behavior result 
indicates that the data generation process for stock 
returns is not from a normal distribution or stable 
Paretian but probably from another leptokurtotic 
distribution, such as the student-t. Kofman and DeVries 
(1989) examine the tail behavior of potato futures returns 
also using the Hill (1975) estimator. Their findings also
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support a data generation process from the student-t, and 
not from the stable Paretian distribution.
McCullough (1994) indicates that studies inferring 
non-Paretian distributions may be flawed in their approach. 
The criticism is that the tail index estimate generated by 
the maximum likelihood technique advocated by DuMouchel 
(1983) cannot be used to reject the presence, or absence, 
of a stable Paretian distribution. Specifically, the 
DuMouchel (1983) technique is unable to distinguish the 
contribution of an infinite variance distribution when the 
tail behavior of the data in question is similar to a 
normal distribution. His results indicate why there may be 
some discrepancy between Akgiray, Booth, and Seifert's 
(1988) result, and the other studies indicating preference 
for finite variance models.
For instance, Akgiray, Booth and Seifert (1988) 
calculate tail parameter estimates close to one, indicating 
tail behavior drastically different from the normal 
distribution. In contrast, the other studies report tail 
index parameters close to two, indicating tail behavior 
similar to the normal distribution. Therefore,
McCullough's (1994) result may be an explanation for the 
conflicting evidence presented in the literature for and 
against using finite versus using infinite variance models 
to describe financial data generating processes.
Whatever the outcome of the controversy generated by 
the conflicting results of Akgiray et. al. (1988), Kojdick
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et. al. (1993), Jansen and DeVries (1991) and Kofman and 
DeVries (1989), they all suggest that examining the 
probability of encountering extreme value observations is 
an alternative to unconditional volatility when measuring 
risk. This suggestion is based on the fact that extreme 
values shed a brighter light on the probabilities of 
anticipating abrupt changes in wealth than using models 
based on data generated from normal processes.
3.2.3 MARGIN MAINTENANCE
3.2.3.1 General Margin Issues
Margin requirements of futures market participants are 
unique in that they do not represent either a premium for 
participation or a down payment on an asset. Futures 
margins are performance bonds used to enforce performance 
of a futures contract. With the evolution of organized and 
advanced futures markets, it can be argued that futures 
margins have become insurance payments by market 
participants to insure against default on the terms of a 
futures contract.
On the other hand, purchasers of option contracts pay 
an option "premium" for the right to either buy or sell a 
certain asset at a prespecified price in the future. The 
option premium is effectively the purchase price of the 
right to either buy or sell the security. The purchaser is 
not obligated to exercise his right if it is not profitable
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to do so.35 Additionally, when common stock is purchased 
on margin, a margin payment is required. However, in this 
case, the margin can be seen as a down payment or 
collateral for the securities.
In setting futures margin levels, the clearinghouse 
must examine the cost/benefit tradeoff of having either too 
low or too high of a margin level. If the margin 
requirement is set too low, the incidence of trader default 
may become unacceptable. On the other hand, if the margin 
requirement is set too high, the costs of transacting 
through the futures market may become exorbitant, 
decreasing the liquidity and price discovery advantages 
often attributed to futures market activity.
Every organized futures exchange (or in general, every 
derivative security exchange) maintains a clearinghouse 
that guarantees contractual performance of all futures 
traders.36 Essentially, the clearinghouse breaks every 
futures trade into two distinct contracts: one contract 
between the buyer and the clearinghouse, and one contract 
between the seller and the clearinghouse. The 
clearinghouse is an independent organization whose
350f course, the seller of the option is obliged to 
live up to the option's agreement if exercised upon.
Margin requirements similar to those of futures 
participants usually apply to sellers of option contracts, 
especially those sold naked.
36The general characteristics of the margin process as 
found in Tucker (1991), Hull (1993), and Duffie (1989) are 
used in this section.
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stockholders are clearing member firms, entities with a 
clear stake in maintaining the integrity of the futures 
trading process. Futures traders must maintain an account 
with a clearing member firm, either directly or indirectly 
through a brokerage firm (futures commodity merchant) in 
order to trade futures contracts.
Since the clearinghouse is completely hedged by 
assuming offsetting positions on every futures trade, its 
exposure to direct market fluctuations is nil. However, 
the credit risk of every futures trader, through his 
clearing member account, impacts the clearinghouse's 
ability to maintain confidence in the futures trading 
process. In order to minimize its loss from potential 
credit defaults, the clearinghouse sets initial margin 
requirements for every clearing members' accounts, and 
requires that every broker maintain acceptable maintenance 
margins for his own clients. Margin requirements vary 
across different futures contracts and are usually tied, 
but not limited to the individual contract's maximum daily 
price limit, if one exists, and the liquidity of the 
contract. Of course, the factor most often cited as the 
determinant of the margin level is the volatility of the 
underlying asset.
One tie-in between extreme value theory and optimal 
margin setting may be through this price limit. The daily 
price limit is established to limit extreme daily price 
fluctuations in either direction. However, the limit is
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usually set so wide as to not impede (truncate) valuable 
price discovery information to the market.
This chapter proposes that the difficult process for 
setting margin requirements can be improved by examining 
the probability of observing values in the tails of price 
change distributions, i.e. extreme returns in either 
direction. A detailed examination of the prudent margin 
setting process is beneficial due to the fact that setting 
the margin too low may result in an increased incidence of 
trader default.37 On the other hand, setting the margin 
too high may impede important price discovery processes 
inherent in the futures trading process by increasing the 
opportunity costs of derivative traders.
Margin requirements are usually set by experienced 
futures market participants through a consensus committee 
decision. Brenner (1981) indicates that the exchanges' 
margin committees are best suited to properly set and 
oversee margin requirements because of their first-hand 
experience with market conditions. Additionally, Brenner 
(1981) notes that margin committees' propensity to quickly 
increase or decrease margin levels 11 in response to changes 
in market conditions11 is a testament to the committee's 
flexibility.
37In addition to the possible increased incidence of 
trader default, setting the margin too low may also result 
in increased noise levels in security prices. This 
increase of noise would serve to decrease the importance of 
the price discovery process provided by derivative trading.
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Factors that may affect the margin committees' 
decisions to set appropriate margin levels are (1) 
underlying asset price levels, (2) underlying asset price 
volatility, (3) volume, (4) levels of speculative and 
hedging positions etc... as discussed in Rutz (1988) and 
Gay, Hunter and Kolb (1986). Hull (1993) states that 
variability in the underlying security is the primary 
factor affecting the optimal margin setting decision. An 
interesting twist on the notion that higher volatility 
"causes" higher margin levels is found in Hardouvelis, 
Pericli, and Theodossiou (1995), where the authors provide 
evidence that volatility is a function of the margin level. 
In particular, higher margin levels cause lower subsequent 
volatility.
The fundamental and overriding reason for setting 
optimal margin levels is to accomplish two goals; maximize 
trading activity, and minimize the probability of margin 
violation. Baer, France and Moser (1994) term these two 
objectives "opportunity costs and prudentiality." The 
authors show that amenably resolving the opposing goals of 
these two objectives are the raison d'&tre of the margin 
committee. Their paper goes beyond the scope of the work 
presented here but is unique in that their model explicitly 
accounts for the opportunity costs of margin deposits and 
examines the tradeoffs between lowering these costs and 
maintaining a comfortable level of prudentiality. Their 
result implies that it is the internalization of the
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opportunity costs and prudentiality that justifies the 
existence of the clearinghouse and the associated margin 
committee.
A reputational based explanation for margin 
requirements is found in Telser (1981). He implies that 
minimum margin levels are constraints against imprudent 
behavior and are used to maintain a certain respectable 
reputation level for futures market participants.38 A 
preference based model introduced by Hunter (1986) 
indicates that there is a positive relationship between the 
minimum margin level and a participant's degree of risk 
aversion.39 The higher the risk aversion, the higher the 
margin level.
In relation to some empirical work on margin setting, 
Figlewski (1984) develops and tests a model designed to 
compute the probability of the first margin violation given 
a certain margin level. Gay, Hunter and Kolb (1986) 
reverse the process, and develop a model that calculates 
the appropriate margin level required given the probability 
of margin violation during any specified time period.
38Evidence of the high level of reputational capital 
held by futures participants is given in Duffie (1989) when 
he states that "no U.S. clearinghouse has ever defaulted on 
its obligations, and that there are relatively few defaults 
by individual traders."
390ne constraint in Hunter's (1986) model is that the 
rational margin level not "exceed the maximum possible loss 
over one trading day." Therefore, extreme value theory may 
be used to test empirically the rationality of minimum 
margin levels.
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Additional empirical analyses have been accomplished by 
Tomek (1985) who examines predicted and actual margin calls 
and their relationship to set margins. These empirical 
papers indicate that margin levels are set quite 
conservatively.
Warshawsky (1989) uses time series data to examine the 
constancy of margins whereas Edwards and Neftci (1988) 
extend his work to a multivariate setting. The results of 
these two papers, however, seem to provide evidence 
contradicting the conservative margin setting results 
previously mentioned. For instance, Warshawsky (1989) 
shows that Figlewski's (1984) and Gay, Hunter and Kolb's 
(1986) distributional assumptions are not met, causing 
incorrect inferences to be drawn. Specifically, the 
underlying data generation process does not follow a normal 
distribution. He uses a non-parametric test to show that 
margin levels were not set as conservatively as implied 
from Figlewski's (1984) and Gay, Hunter and Kolb's (1986) 
papers.
Edwards and Neftci (1988) add further doubt to the 
conservatively set margin issue by examining multiple 
contracts. They find that margin committees usually 
concentrate only on a single contract and do not account 
for the possibility that traders hold multiple contracts. 
Basically, holding multiple contracts increases the 
probability of default by an individual trader. Edwards 
and Neftci's (1988) implication is that setting margin
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requirements should also account for the multivariate 
nature of price movements and contract positions.
Except for the Warshawsky (1989) and Edwards and 
Neftci (1988) papers, most of the extant literature uses 
models assuming that price changes of futures contracts, 
and its related assets, follow a normal distribution. 
Chapter two of this dissertation documents that intraday 
price changes in Germany's spot and futures markets are 
highly leptokurtotic, and fail the Kolmogorov normality 
test. This result implies that Germany's spot and futures 
data do not originate from a normal distribution and that 
the elevated levels of kurtosis imply a higher than 
expected incidence of extreme observations.
If margins are set assuming a normally distributed 
data generation process, the nonnormality may affect the 
determination of an optimal margin. In particular, methods 
that rely on the normality assumption do not take into 
account the added risk present in leptokurtotically 
generated extreme values. These models may tend to 
underestimate both the incidence of maintenance margin 
violations and the prudent margin required for reducing 
margin violations at prescribed probability levels. On the 
other hand, if an ad hoc increase in the margin level is 
made to counteract the underestimation, information related 
to price discovery may be lost by decreased trading levels.
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3.2.3.2 Germany Specific Margin Issues40
In Germany, the derivatives product clearinghouse is 
the Deutsche Terminborse (DTB) GmbH. This is the central 
organization for clearing both options and futures 
transactions. Similar to clearinghouses on the U.S. 
market, the primary goal of the DTB's clearinghouse is to 
guarantee all transactions on the exchange. It executes 
this goal in a number of different ways. First, the 
clearinghouse assumes its role as counterpart for every 
transaction on the system. Second, the clearinghouse acts 
as intermediary for delivery of funds and financial 
instruments at settlement. Third, calculation and 
collection of variation margins are accomplished by the 
clearinghouse through monitoring real-time information on 
the options and futures positions of members. Finally, the 
clearinghouse provides usual "banking" functions such as 
member account deposits, withdrawals, and cash payment 
receipts for activity fees.
All DTB trading members fit into one of three 
categories; l)General Clearing Member (GCM), 2)Direct 
Clearing Member (DCM), and 3)Non-Clearing Member (NCM).
The GCM is a trader who can clear his own trades, client 
trades, and transactions from NCM's. The DCM can settle 
transactions only for its own or its client's accounts. As
40Information on the DTB's clearing and margining 
activities was gathered from personal contacts with DTB 
personnel and DTB provided literature.
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inferred by the GCM definition, the NCM's must settle their 
transactions through a GCM. GCM's and DCM's are directly 
responsible to the DTB for all obligations they have agreed 
to clear. NCM's and clients of member firms have no direct 
responsibility to the DTB.
To become a DTB trading member, or exchange 
participant, and gain access to the DTB trading system, 
there are a few requirements that need to be met. The 
particulars are available directly from the exchange, but 
generally, the member firm must be an operating business 
establishment with meaningful exchange business conducted 
on the DTB. There are restrictions and basic training 
qualifications that must be met by the participants' 
personnel. Finally, since the DTB is a totally electronic 
exchange, with no trading floor, the exchange participants 
must equip themselves with DTB authorized hardware and 
software. Periodically, members will be required to update 
both hardware and software to meet the changing 
technological landscape.
To maintain a certain level of security against 
default, the exchange has set minimum financial 
requirements of its clearing members. GCM's must maintain 
a minimum DM250 million of net equity capital whereas DCM's 
are only required to maintain a net equity position of DM25 
million. The additional capital required for the GCM's is 
a direct consequence of its ability to clear NCM 
transactions. Additionally, the GCM's and DCM's must have
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third party bank letters of credit in the amounts of DM10 
million and DM2 million, respectively.
To facilitate payment of exchange fees and margin 
calls, every member must maintain an account (called the 
LZB account) at the Landeszentralbank Hessen, Haupstelle 
Frankfurt am Main (State Central Bank in Hessen, Main 
Office, Frankfurt). In addition, every participant must 
also maintain a security deposit account (DKV account) at 
the Deutscher Kassenverein AG, in Frankfurt. The purpose 
of the DKV account is to facilitate delivery of stock and 
or bond certificates.
At the present time, the DTB has implemented only 
daily margin settlement procedures. Margin calls are 
generated when the margin requirement of a participant's 
option or futures positions goes beyond the market value of 
securities or cash deposited as collateral. The DTB 
arrives at the appropriate margin requirement or excess in 
an account by netting positions in 21 margin classes.
These classes are maintained in order to project potential 
impacts of price changes in individual assets.
For example, the DAX margin class contains the Futures 
on the DAX contracts (FDAX), the Options on the DAX 
contracts (ODAX), and the Options on the Futures DAX (OFDX) 
contracts. The total margin requirement is made up of
149
three components: the futures spread margin, the premium 
margin, and the additional margin.41
If an investor holds only FDAX contracts, his daily 
margin requirement would presently be set in the following 
fashion. First, whatever the contract price of the 
underlying DAX, the clearinghouse would add and subtract 
130 points. The resulting DAX values would then be 
multiplied by 100 (the futures contract size) and then 
multiplied by the requisite number of short and long 
positions. The long or short position that results in the 
larger margin requirement is used to determine the 
requisite margin level that must be deposited in an LZB 
account. Currently, the approximate level of the DAX 
(around 2000) and the margin requirement for a futures 
contract (DM13,000 per contract) results in an initial 
margin of approximately 6.5%, a historically targeted 
figure.
The contribution made by the extreme value analysis to 
the German stock index futures markets is its ability to 
examine the impacts of extreme values on intraday margin 
violation probabilities. Because the exchange does not 
presently have intradaily margin requirements, the 
information provided in this dissertation should be 
beneficial to the DTB exchange officials. Naturally, the
4lEdwards and Nefcti's (1988) result indicates that 
examining the impacts of extreme values on multi-contract 
margin requirements is an interesting topic and is an area 
for potential future research.
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information contained within this dissertation should be 
useful to decision makers at other markets when examining 
alternatives to existing margin setting procedures.
3.3 DATA EMPLOYED
The transactional data used in this paper are provided 
by the DTB and cover all contracts with at least 6 months 
worth of trading data from January 1992 through September 
1994. This selection process allowed for the analysis of 
all futures contracts from June 1992 to September 1994. 
During this time, the DAX has achieved lows of around 1400 
and highs around 2300. Towards the end of the time period 
analyzed, the DAX was trading at a level around 2000.
Only trading days with more than two transactions and 
having both positive and negative price changes were 
considered. Finally, the data examined were cleaned of 
mistrades. Mistrades are transactions where some error 
either on the buyer or seller side of a transaction was 
made in entering the transaction. For example, inadvertent 
keystrokes could have caused too high a price, or too many 
contracts to be entered in the system. Obviously, wrong 
price entries would have direct consequences on the extreme 
value analysis.
Recall that the objective of this chapter is to 
analyze and provide the DTB with information regarding 
intradaily price change extremes. Since the DTB's daily 
margin requirements are in existence, it was decided that 
the extreme value would focus on the intradaily aspects of
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margin levels. Hence, the results of this chapter are 
important since they provide information on the intradaily 
aspects of the DAX futures price changes not previously 
documented, and they provide information on intradaily 
margin setting procedures not presently used by the DTB.
In order to examine maximum and minimum intradaily 
price changes, this paper calculates all possible 
combinations of intradaily price changes. Price changes 
are calculated by taking the log of a later transaction's 
price level and subtracting the log of an earlier 
transaction's price level (InP, - lnP^). After all 
possible combinations of transactional price changes are 
calculated, maximums and minimums for each day are 
generated.42
When applying extreme value theory to any set of data, 
one of the most important variables that must be controlled 
is the "return period." According to Kinnison (1985), 
extreme measurements should be made at equal distant points 
in time, daily periods in this case. This research differs 
from previous applications of extreme value theory to 
financial market data in that it uses maximums and minimums 
from intradaily price changes. The selection procedure
42The intradaily price changes are calculated using 
SAS's PROC IML routine to create dynamic vector sizes. 
Each daily maximum and minimum are chosen from an (N(N- 
l)/2)xl vector where N is the number of transactions 
occurring in that day. Calculation time was extensive, 
taking over eight days to complete.
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used here results in a natural and consistent holding 
period (one day).
Longin (1994) chooses the maximum and minimum price 
changes of the S&P500 index over 60 non-overlapping trading 
days. Even though it is reasonable to incorporate a 
maximal and minimal price change every quarter, what would 
happen if one chose one every month, or one every week?
The subjectiveness of Longin's procedure in selecting 
observations and holding periods is not present in this 
work.
Additionally, research work applying Hill's (1975) 
estimator must choose which sections of the distribution to 
include in the analysis. Usually, a "Hill Horror Plot" is 
examined to test the sensitivity of the estimated tail 
parameter value to the number of observations chosen.43 
This judgmental method for choosing the number of 
observations is similar to the old practice of examining a 
correllogram when attempting to determine whether a series 
was stationary. Again, the subjectiveness of this 
procedure is readily apparent, and not employed in this 
chapter.
3.4 METHOD OF ANALYSIS
This dissertation applies a generalized extreme value 
parametric model first used on financially related data by
43The term "Hill Horror Plot" was coined by Sid Resnick 
at the Conference on Multivariate Extreme Value Estimation 
with Applications to Economics and Finance, Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam, May 26-28, 1994.
153
Longin (1994) . The method calculates the domain of 
attraction for the maximal and minimal intradaily 
observations. Longin's (1994) model is not "new" in the 
sense that the distributional form has never been described 
before. In reality, his model is a reparameterization of 
Maritz and Munro's (1967) Generalized Extreme Value 
distribution. However, Longin's approach is important 
because it had not been applied to financial market data 
before. For continuity purposes, this paper uses 
approximately the same symbols and letters found in 
Longin's equations.
Longin (1994) begins his analysis by assuming that log 
price changes of a futures contract, for instance, are 
random occurrences and can be measured by the random 
variable R (for returns). He lets fR and FR represent the 
probability density and the cumulative probability density 
functions of R, respectively. Also, he lets Rlf i?2... R„ be 
the random variables measuring the returns at time 1, 2,
... n, with the extreme values of each random variable 
defined as the minima and maxima. Finally, Longin 
designates MIN and MAX as the minimum and maximum values, 
respectively, achieved from the n random variables Rt,
R2/ ... R„.
If MIN and MAX are independent and identically 
distributed, that is, they follow the random walk theory of 
speculative security prices, Longin (1994) states that the 
exact distributions of MIN and MAX are given by:
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(27)
Since the exact distributional form is a power 
exponential function, values close to the center of the 
distribution have little effect on the distributional 
properties of extreme values. Hence, the distribution of 
both the minima and maxima extreme values depends heavily 
on the properties of the distribution of large negative or 
large positive values of return observations.
Like any investigation of the distributional forms for 
a set of data, the exact sample distribution of Equations 
(26) and (27) is not known with certainty. Therefore, 
Longin (1994), relying on results found in Gnedenko (1943), 
Jenkinson (1955) and Tiago de Oliveira (1973), presents a 
central limit theorem result for the normalized MIN and MAX 
random variables (where each variable is normalized by an 
appropriate location (j8) and dispersion parameter (a) e.g.
( (MINn-(3MIN) /aMIN) and (MAXn-(3MAX) /aMAX) ) MINKORM and MAXNORM. 
The limiting results become the following:
-exP t “ (1 +Tmlnrs) ]
M^AXNORM=eX1P (l~'CmaXrs) x ]
Longin's (1994) parameter r (the tail index) is responsible 
for determining the type (i.e. Type I, Type II, or Type 
III) of distribution from which extreme values are drawn.
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The r may be either less than, equal to, or greater 
than zero. For instance, when r=0, the limiting 
distribution corresponds to the Type I extreme value 
distribution (also called a Gumbel distribution). When 
t >0, the limiting distribution corresponds to the Type III 
extreme value distribution (also called a Weibull 
distribution), and when t <0, the limiting distribution is 
of the Type II extreme value distribution (called a Frechet 
distribution). t is similar to the tail index of Paretian 
distributions, and is representative of the impact extreme 
values have on the underlying distribution. In particular, 
r gives an indication of the thickness of the tails found 
in the underlying distribution.
One useful result of extreme value theory is that the 
limiting distribution of the extreme values follows the 
same form as the tail behavior of the random variable's 
parent distribution. That is, normally distributed data 
exhibiting an exponentially decreasing tail structure will 
generate tail indexes equal to zero. These tail 
observations will follow a Gumbel (Type I) extreme value 
distribution. Fat-tailed distribution generated extreme 
values, such as stable Paretian, student-t, or other 
leptokurtotic distributions will generate tail indexes less 
than zero, indicating that these extreme values are drawn 
from a Frechet (Type II) distribution. Weibull (Type III), 
or possibly Gumbel (Type I), distributions may generate
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tail observations for random variables containing some sort 
of bounds (truncated data).44
Another interesting feature of extreme value theory is 
that violations of the i.i.d. assumption do not alter the 
domain of attraction for the extreme values. For example, 
Berman (1963) replicates the tail index results on serially 
correlated data. He finds that extreme values follow 
Gumbel, Weibull, or Frechet distributions, even when they 
are not independent.
ARCH and GARCH models explicitly allow for conditional 
dependence in the second moment and are often useful in 
explaining time series behavior when the underlying data 
generating process exhibits leptokurtosis.45 DeHaan, 
Resnick, Rootzen and DeVries (1989) document that if the 
random variable of interest follows an ARCH process, the 
extreme values found from the data generation process 
follow a Frechet distribution. Therefore a linkage between 
ARCH process and extreme values exists.
Mixture of normal distributions are frequently used to 
explain arrival of information processes. Harris (1987) 
documents that daily arrival of information for stock
‘•‘Futures contracts often have daily price limits 
attached which cause trading to cease when the limits are 
reached. These price limits may represent bounds on 
extreme observations, and possibly increase the probability 
of observing Weibull distributions.
45Engle's (1982) ARCH and Bollerslev's (1986) GARCH 
models have been studied extensively in the financial 
literature.
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returns can be explained in a mixture of distributions 
context. In an examination of information arrival defined 
as a mixture of distributions, Lamoureaux and Lastrapes
(1990) present evidence that volume is the mixing variable 
that accounts for information flow by showing diminished 
GARCH effects when accounting for volume.46 Leadbetter, 
Lindgren and Rootzen (1983) document the link between 
extreme value theory and mixture of normal distributions by 
showing that extreme observations derived from mixture of 
normal distributions follow Gumbel (Type I) distributions. 
Hence, there may be some benefit to combining mixture of 
distributions research with extreme value research.
Estimation of the appropriate distributional 
parameters is accomplished using standard nonlinear 
regression techniques on the following regression 
equations:
- L o g [- L o g ( )  ] = - ^ L o g a max--^Logr[ainax-tmax(wa^/n-pmax) ] + ua
(30)
46Recent refinements of mixture of distributions 
research are made by Richardson and Smith (1994). The 
authors demonstrate the usefulness of mixture of 
distributions concepts by improving on the mixture of 
distributions property estimation technique. Specifically, 
they apply a general method-of-moment estimator in their 
examination of the Dow Jones 30 firms' information arrival 
processes.
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- L o f f [ - L o g (— — ) ] = - ^ —L o g a ttdn- —^ r - L o g [ a ”'in- x mLri(^min-M INm) ] +ua .iV+1 m^in m^in m
(31)
Recall that r is the tail index parameter, a is the 
dispersion parameter and 0 is the location parameter of the 
appropriate tail distribution. Also, MAXm (MINm) is the 
maximum (minimum) observation for the particular sequence 
of observations being analyzed. These regressions are an 
extension of plotting data on extreme value probability 
paper. Kinnison (1985) notes that the goal of this 
regression is to fit the expected cumulative probability 
frequencies to their observed extreme values. Essentially, 
the regression is a straight forward curve fitting exercise 
of regressing plotting positions against extreme values.
After estimation of the associated tail distribution 
parameters, an analysis of the appropriate margin setting 
level given various probabilities of margin violations is 
made. This test is accomplished using the normal 
distribution as a benchmark for comparison, and then using 
the distribution dictated by the sign of the tail 
parameter.47 For example, a sample's unconditional mean 
and unconditional variance are substituted into a normal
47Following the convention set in Jansen and deVries
(1991), Kofman and deVries (1989), Koedijk, Stork, and 
deVries (1992) and Kofman (1993), only those contracts 
exhibiting Type II extreme value behavior will be 
considered.
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distribution equation, and then the appropriate margin 
values are solved using Equations (30) and (31).
Longin (1994) gives the analytical relationship 
between the margin level and probability of margin 
violation for long and short positions assuming normal 
distributions to be:
(-£!£) ]a (32)
o
%short=1. [(b (_£Zlt) ] a (33)
O
where $ = CDF for N(0,1). Additionally, he shows the 
relationship between margin violation and margin levels 
assuming the extreme value distribution as being:
7c=l-exp [-[1-t [ - ^ ^ ]  ] x ] (34)
a
where the appropriate max or min superscripts are
substituted depending on whether it is a long (min) or
short (max) position. Additionally, r is preceded with a
minus (plus) and /3 is preceded with a plus (minus) for long
(short) positions. Finally, both of these theoretical 
distributions are compared to the resultant empirical 
probability exhibited by the data and given as:
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N
s^hort- .r) (36)
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These distributional forms are used to determine whether 
the normal distribution assumption causes inadvertent 
margin violation expectations vs. those from the 
appropriate extreme value distribution.
Longin's (1994) results using S&P 500 stock index data 
indicate that the normal distribution underestimates the 
appropriate margin level at most margin violation 
probabilities. His results also indicate that the normal 
distribution underestimates the probability of margin 
violation given various maintenance margin levels. Whether 
or not this pattern is exhibited in Germany is an empirical 
question.
The estimation procedure of the parameters from the 
limiting distributions of extreme values is relatively 
straight-forward. All that is required is to estimate 
three parameters: the tail index, the location and the 
dispersion parameters. Most importantly, not only does the 
tail index yield the appropriate distribution of the 
extreme values, but it also yields information about the 
thickness of the tails for the underlying return 
distribution.
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3.5 REGRESSION RESULTS, AND EFFECTS ON OPTIMAL MARGIN
LEVELS
3.5.1 Regression Results
Table 13 lists the results of using the regression 
found in Equation (30) for the maximal intradaily returns. 
The values for maximal transactional returns range from 
1.707% to 3.705%. The average maximum price change is 
around 3%.
All parameter estimates for t™", a'"", and /3"““ are 
significant at p-values less than 0.01, except for the 
December 1992 contract.48 Since the majority of the 
contracts appear to follow a Type II extreme value limiting 
distribution, these results are similar to those found in 
Longin (1994), and forecasted by Jansen and DeVries (1989), 
Kofman and DeVries (1989), and Kofman (1993). That is, the 
extreme values resulting from increases in future contract 
prices appear to follow a Type II limiting distribution. 
However, it is noteworthy that the maximum values for the 
March 1993 contract appear to follow a Type III limiting 
distribution, whereas the December 1992 contract's maximal 
returns appear to follow a Type I extreme value limiting 
distribution.
Table 14 lists the results of using the regression 
found in Equation (31) for the minimal intradaily returns. 
The values for minimal transactional returns range from -
48The author is using the 1% level as a cutoff for 
statistical significance.
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1.527% to -4.788%. The average minimum price change is 
around -3.5%, higher in magnitude than the average maximum 
price change. Apparently, the observance of extreme values 
is not symmetric around the center of the parent 
distribution. The extreme negative price changes appear to 
be larger in magnitude than the extreme positive price 
changes.
The estimated parameters for the minimum returns, 
rmax' amoX' and Qmx indicate limiting distribution inferences 
similar to the maximum price changes. For the most part, 
the parameters are significant and indicate that the 
extreme minimum price changes originate from a Type II 
limiting distribution. However, the extreme negative price 
changes for the September 1993 and December 1993 contracts 
are apparently generated from a Type I limiting 
distribution.
One characteristic revealed in Tables 13 and 14 is 
noteworthy. It appears that both the dispersion and 
location parameters of the contracts have increased over 
time. One explanation for the result indicates that 
extreme intradaily price changes are becoming more frequent 
and are achieving larger magnitudes. On the other hand, 
this result may indicate that the extreme values possesses 
non-stationary characteristics, causing the noted trend. 
Further investigation into why this is occurring would be 
an interesting extension of this study.
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Table 13
Estimated Parameters for Maximum 
Intradaily Price Changes 
See Equation (30)
Contract N
Maximum
Price
Change ^ imx g^max
Jun 92 115 1.707 -0.202 0.212 0.365
Sep 92 179 2.906 -0.269 0.277 0.375
Dec 92 186 2.690 -0.017* 0.446 0.496
Mar 93 187 2.424 0.035 0.414 0.607
Jun 93 174 3.705 -0.154 0.299 0.472
Sep 93 175 2.813 -0.141 0.315 0.448
Dec 93 174 2.747 -0.072 0.367 0.494
Mar 94 165 3.706 -0.087 0.455 0.607
Jun 94 176 3.546 -0.112 0.387 0.619
Sep 94 162 2.845 -0.068 0.421 0.647
Estimation of the extreme value parameters is by Equation
(30):
- L o g [ - L o g (— — ) ] =— Logr[a”nax-Tmax(MAXm- pmax) ] +u
^+3. i^di&x 4
All parameter estimates are significant at p-values < 
0.0001, except for * which is insignificantly different 
from zero with p-value of 0.1667.
3.5.2 Effects on Margin Levels and Violation 
Probabilities
The appropriate intradaily price changes 
resulting from the extreme value distribution are solved 
from the appropriately signed parameters found in Equation 
(34) for long and short positions. To calculate these
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price changes, the following equations are used:
<38)
for the long positions and,
[l-t-lnd-n)]1'“]+P“* 09)^max
for the short positions. Where rmiI and are the 
calculated margin levels given the violation probabilities 
(7r) found in the Table 3. Note that the terms margin 
levels and price changes are interchangeable in this 
analysis.
Rearranging Equations (32) and (33) allows calculation 
of the minimal and maximal intradaily price changes 
assuming normally distributed data for both long and short 
positions. These formulas are:
r n'in = $ - l [ 1 - ( 1 - 1t) « ] o  + H  (40)
for the long positions and,
r (41)
for the short positions. $‘l is the inverse function of a 
standard normal variate and o and ju are the standard 
deviation and mean of the underlying series.
Rearranging Equations (35) and (36) allows the 
empirical maximums and minimums to be found in the data.
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These equations are:
rmiii#=n2°nff*N  (42)
for the long positions and,
rmax#=7iffhort*^ . (43)
Here, r^# and rmin# are the calculated rank numbers given 
each probability (7r) level.
Table 14
Estimated Parameters for Minimum 
Intradaily Price Changes 
See Equation (31)
Contract N
Minimum
Price
Change 7-min ami» 0min
Jun 92 115 -1.527 -0.206 0.189 -0.359
Sep 92 179 -4.684 -0.341 0.291 -0.395
Dec 92 186 -4.788 -0.229 0.397 -0.504
Mar 93 187 -4.687 -0.210 0.359 -0.589
Jun 93 174 -4.341 -0.202 0.312 -0.458
Sep 93 175 -2.180 0.003** 0.365 -0.488
Dec 93 174 -2.157 0.031*** 0.412 -0.519
Mar 94 165 -4.034 -0.140 0.462 -0.602
Jun 94 176 -3.226 -0.097 0.503 -0.610
Sep 94 162 -3.478 -0.108 0.456 -0.661
Estimation of the extreme value parameters is by Equation
(31):
- L o g [- L o g (-7 7-7-) ] = - ^ r -L o g a min— ^ - L o g [ a min- x min^ aln-M IN m) ] +um.
All parameter estimates are significant at p-values < 
0.0001, except for ** p-value=0.719, *** p-value=0.025.
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Finally, recall that the minimal price changes for the 
September 1993 and December 1993 contracts and the maximal 
price changes for the December 1992 and March 1993 
contracts do not follow a Type II limiting extreme value 
distribution. Hence, the extreme value analysis is not 
carried out on these contracts. The extreme value results 
for these non-conforming contracts are represented as "na" 
in both Tables 15 and 16. Table 15 contains the results 
for the margin violation probability analysis for long and 
short futures positions.
Interpretation of Table 15's Panels is as follows.
The first column contains given probabilities of margin 
violation that are input into Equations (39) through (44). 
The next three columns represent the intradaily price 
change (margin level) calculated from those equations for a 
long position. For instance, when examining Table 15,
Panel B, the intradaily price changes associated with a 
margin violation probability of 0.04 are -1.681% assuming a 
normal distribution, -2.083% assuming the appropriate 
extreme value distribution, and -1.947% actually observed 
in the data. An intuitive interpretation of these results 
is as follows.
If the margin committee is willing to accept 
intradaily margin violations four out of every 100 trading 
days, the normal distribution suggests setting the margin 
requirement at 1.68% of the transacted contract value. The 
extreme value distribution, on the other hand, recommends
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setting the margin requirement at 2.083% for this margin 
violation probability. The actual sample data probability, 
as represented in the Empirical column, shows that there 
were only four out of every 100 minimal price change 
observations greater (in negative terms) than 1.947%.
An analogous example can be made using the short 
position information found in the last three columns of 
each Panel. For instance, Table 15 Panel E shows that at 
an acceptable margin violation probability of l out of 100 
trading days, the extreme value distribution recommends a 
required margin of 2.474% of the contract value. The 
normal distribution requires only a 1.078% margin. 
Empirically, the data show that 1 out of every 100 trading 
days had intradaily price changes exceeding 2.207%.
The pattern found in Table 15 can be summed up in two 
statements. First, the extreme value distribution 
generates larger required margin levels than those 
recommended by assuming normally distributed data, and the 
extreme value's data more closely track the observed 
extremes, shown by the empirical distribution results.
The pattern of the extreme value distribution 
generating larger required margin levels than the normal 
distribution, and the pattern of more closely tracking the 
empirical distribution is shown in all contracts and for 
both long and short futures positions. However, the better 
fit criteria is not the only information that can be 
garnered from Table 15.
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The power of the extreme value analysis is its ability 
to extrapolate required margin levels above and beyond 
those observed in the empirical distribution. For example, 
Table 15 Panel E indicates that if the margin setting 
committee did not want to see an intradaily margin 
violation for a long position except once every 4 years or 
so (probability = 0.001), it should set the margin level to 
5.160% of the contract value. This margin requirement is 
much larger than the value suggested by the normal 
distribution (1.332%) and helps the margin committee make 
better informed decisions about margin violations that have 
not occurred, but still have positive probability of 
happening. Essentially, the results found in Table 15 
indicate that prudent margin levels should be set using 
extreme value theory.
Table 16 contains 10 panels (A-J) corresponding to the 
margin violation examination for each of the contracts. 
However, in this case, a set margin level is used to 
calculate the probability of margin violation. In essence, 
the Panels in Table 4 answer the question, "If margin 
levels are set to a given percentage, how many trading days 
should intradaily price changes cause margin violations?"
An example using Table 16 Panel E may provide some 
direction for answering that question. Take the 
information pertinent to setting the margin level for a 
long position first. If margin levels are set at 3% of 
contract value, the extreme value distribution predicts
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that intradaily price declines greater than 3% will happen 
about eight trading days out of 1000. The normal 
distribution forecasts no intradaily price changes 
exceeding that level. The sample data suggest that at 
least six trading days out of 1000 experienced intradaily 
price changes greater than 3%.
On the other hand, data pertinent to short positions 
indicate a different result. The extreme value analysis 
indicates that only four out of 1000 trading days will 
experience price increases at the 3% level. The normal 
distribution predicts none, while the sample data for the 
June 1993 contract had six days where price increases above 
3% were observed.
An examination of all Table 16's Panels indicates that 
the extreme value distribution generates a positive 
probability of margin violation at higher margin levels 
than the normal distribution suggests. Additionally, the 
extreme value probabilities track those generated by the 
sample much better than those generated from the normal 
distribution. This latter result is quite evident by the 
fact that the normally distributed model usually only 
generates two or three useful probabilities per contract 
position, i.e. only a small number of the probabilities are 
less than one. Even if the probabilities are less than 
one, they are often farther away from those probabilities 
observed empirically than those generated from extreme 
value theory.
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Table 15 
Panel A
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the June 1992 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -0.646 -0.900 -0.921 0.676 0.968 1.031
0.050 -0.689 -1.328 -1.220 0.719 1.227 1.188
0.040 -0.703 -1.214 -1.268 0.733 1.317 1.202
0.030 -0.720 -1.324 -1.304 0.750 1.439 1.425
0.020 -0.743 -1.491 -1.395 0.773 1.623 1.530
0.010 -0.781 -1.807 -1.527 0.811 1.972 1.707
0.005 -0.817 -2.172 -1.527 0.847 2.373 1.707
0.004 -0.828 -2.301 na 0.858 2.514 na
0.003 -0.843 -2.476 na 0.873 2.707 na
0.002 -0.862 -2.740 na 0.893 2.996 na
0.001 -0.896 -3.247 na 0.926 3.550 na
0.0005 -0.928 -3.832 na 0.958 4.187 na
0.0004 -0.938 -4.038 na 0.968 4.412 na
0.0003 -0.951 -4.319 na 0.981 4.717 na
0.0002 -0.969 -4.744 na 0.999 5.178 na
0.0001 -0.999 -5.559 na 1.029 6.060 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel B
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the September 1992 Contract
Zntradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.563 -1.380 -1.406 1.391 1.231 1.230
0.050 -1.653 -1.892 -1.809 1.482 1.633 1.640
0.040 -1.681 -2.083 -1.947 1.510 1.778 1.760
0.030 -1.717 -2.350 -2.250 1.545 1.978 2.016
0.020 -1.765 -2.772 -2.454 1.593 2.285 2.127
0.010 -1.844 -3.641 -2.859 1.672 2.892 2.419
0.005 -1.920 -4.739 -4.684 1.748 3.621 2.906
0.004 -1.944 -5.152 -4.684 1.772 3.886 2.906
0.003 -1.974 -5.731 -4.684 1.802 4.252 2.906
0.002 -2.016 -6.651 na 1.844 4.818 na
0.001 -2.085 -8.551 na 1.914 5.941 na
0.0005 -2.153 -10.957 na 1.982 7.293 na
0.0004 -2.174 -11.861 na 2.003 7.784 na
0.0003 -2.201 -13.132 na 2.030 8.463 na
0.0002 -2.239 -15.150 na 2.068 9.514 na
0.0001 -2.302 -19.318 na 2.131 11.598 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel C
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the December 1992 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.448 -1.672 -1.641 1.420. na 1.598
0.050 -1.536 -2.192 -2.054 1.507 na 1.846
0.040 -1.563 -2.376 -2.229 1.534 na 1.915
0.030 -1.597 -2.626 -2.251 1.569 na 2.012
0.020 -1.643 -3.005 -2.598 1.615 na 2.245
0.010 -1.720 -3.739 -4.636 1.691 na 2.596
0.005 -1.793 -4.596 -4.788 1.764 na 2.690
0.004 -1.816 -4.902 -4.788 1.787 na 2.690
0.003 -1.845 -5.320 -4.788 1.816 na 2.690
0.002 -1.886 -5.957 na 1.857 na na
0.001 -1.953 -7.193 na 1.924 na na
0.0005 -2.018 -8.641 na 1.990 na na
0.0004 -2.039 -9.158 na 2.010 na na
0.0003 -2.065 -9.865 na 2.036 na na
0.0002 -2.101 -10.944 na 2.073 na na
0.0001 -2.162 -13.035 na 2.134 na na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel D
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the March 1993 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.109 -1.620 -1.547 1.087 na 1.485
0.050 -1.156 -2.067 -2.026 1.153 na 1.880
0.040 -1.177 -2.224 -2.062 1.173 na 2.008
0.030 -1.202 -2.436 -2.064 1.199 na 2.044
0.020 -1.238 -2.756 -2.259 1.234 na 2.068
0.010 -1.295 -3.367 -4.103 1.292 na 2.207
0.005 -1.351 -4.071 -4.687 1.348 na 2.424
0.004 -1.368 -4.321 -4.687 1.365 na 2.424
0.003 -1.390 -4.660 -4.687 1.388 na 2.424
0.002 -1.214 -5.173 na 1.418 na na
0.001 -1.472 -6.158 na 1.469 na na
0.0005 -1.522 -7.297 na 1.519 na na
0.0004 -1.537 -7.701 na 1.534 na na
0.0003 -1.557 -8.249 na 1.554 na na
0.0002 -1.585 -9.081 na 1.582 na na
0.0001 -1.631 -10.676 na 1.628 na na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel E
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the June 1993 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -0.995 -1.349 -1.320 0.897 1.277 1.215
0.050 -1.054 -1.730 -1.610 0.955 1.599 1.498
0.040 -1.072 -1.863 -1.641 0.973 1.709 1.559
0.030 -1.095 -2.043 -1.799 0.996 1.855 1.571
0.020 -1.126 -2.314 -2.062 1.027 2.072 1.599
0.010 -1.177 -2.830 -2.147 1.078 2.474 2.008
0.005 -1.225 -3.422 -4.341 1.127 2.920 3.705
0.004 -1.241 -3.631 -4.341 1.142 3.047 3.705
0.003 -1.260 -3.914 -4.341 1.162 3.280 3.705
0.002 -1.287 -4.342 na 1.189 3.586 na
0.001 -1.332 -5.160 na 1.233 4.156 na
0.0005 -1.375 -6.100 na 1.277 4.789 na
0.0004 -1.389 -6.432 na 1.291 5.007 na
0.0003 -1.407 -6.883 na 1.308 5.300 na
0.0002 -1.431 -7.564 na 1.332 5.736 na
0.0001 -1.471 -8.867 na 1.373 6.547 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel F
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the September 1993 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.233 na -1.325 1.211 1.282 1.286
0.050 -1.308 na -1.535 1.287 1.609 1.558
0.040 -1.331 na -1.708 1.310 1.720 1.568
0.030 -1.361 na -1.826 1.339 1.878 1.856
0.020 -1.401 na -1.829 1.379 2.085 1.918
0.010 -1.466 na -2.022 1.445 2.486 2.501
0.005 -1.529 na -2.180 1.508 2.926 2.813
0.004 -1.549 na -2.180 1.527 3.077 2.813
0.003 -1.574 na -2.180 1.553 3.279 2.813
0.002 -1.609 na na 1.587 3.577 na
0.001 -1.667 na na 1.645 4.128 na
0.0005 -1.723 na na 1.701 4.738 na
0.0004 -1.741 na na 1.719 4.944 na
0.0003 -1.763 na na 1.742 5.222 na
0.0002 -1.795 na na 1.773 5.635 na
0.0001 -1.847 na na 1.825 6.397 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel G
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the December 1993 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.142 na -1.473 1.128 1.389 1.465
0.050 -1.212 na -1.758 1.198 1.708 1.628
0.040 -1.234 na -1.810 1.219 1.812 1.817
0.030 -1.261 na -1.857 1.247 1.949 2.012
0.020 -1.298 na -1.921 1.284 2.145 2.177
0.010 -1.359 na -1.974 1.345 2.492 2.209
0.005 -1.418 na -2.157 1.403 2.856 2.747
0.004 -1.436 na -2.157 1.422 2.977 2.747
0.003 -1.459 na -2.157 1.445 3.135 2.747
0.002 -1.492 na na 1.477 3.364 na
0.001 -1.545 na na 1.531 3.772 na
0.0005 -1.598 na na 1.583 4.199 na
0.0004 -1.614 na na 1.600 4.342 na
0.0003 -1.635 na na 1.621 4.529 na
0.0002 -1.664 na na 1.650 4.799 na
0.0001 -1.713 na na 1.699 5.279 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel H
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the March 1994 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.711 -1.824 -1.754 1.633 1.783 1.783
0.050 -1.815 -2.301 -2.159 1.737 2.150 2.096
0.040 -1.874 -2.466 -2.579 1.769 2.286 2.162
0.030 -1.888 -2.682 -2.808 1.809 2.465 2.584
0.020 -1.943 -3.001 -3.118 1.864 2.723 2.606
0.010 -2.034 -3.586 -3.344 1.955 3.183 2.907
0.005 -2.121 -4.229 -4.034 2.042 3.671 3.706
0.004 -2.148 -4.450 -4.034 2.069 3.835 3.706
0.003 -2.182 -4.744 na 2.104 4.050 na
0.002 -2.230 -5.180 na 2.152 4.362 na
0.001 -2.310 -5.984 na 2.232 4.922 na
0.0005 -2.388 -6.869 na 2.309 5.517 na
0.0004 -2.412 -7.173 na 2.333 5.716 na
0.0003 -2.443 -7.579 na 2.364 5.978 na
0.0002 -2.486 -8.180 na 2.408 6.360 na
0.0001 -2.559 -9.290 na 2.480 7.044 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel I
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the June 1994 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.460 -1.875 -1.773 1.306 1.609 1.674
0.050 -1.545 -2.340 -2.486 1.392 1.982 1.957
0.040 -1.571 -2.495 -2.724 1.418 2.107 2.136
0.030 -1.604 -2.699 -2.906 1.451 2.271 2.179
0.020 -1.650 -2.994 -2.947 1.496 2.511 2.207
0.010 -1.724 -3.523 -3.168 1.570 2.945 2.670
0.005 -1.795 -4.087 -3.226 1.642 3.413 3.546
0.004 -1.817 -4.277 -3.226 1.664 3.571 3.546
0.003 -1.846 -4.527 -3.226 1.692 3.781 3.546
0.002 -1.855 -4.892 na 1.732 4.089 na
0.001 -1.951 -5.549 na 1.797 4.647 na
0.0005 -2.014 -6.252 na 1.861 5.520 na
0.0004 -2.034 -6.488 na 1.881 5.454 na
0.0003 -2.060 -6.801 na 1.906 5.725 na
0.0002 -2.095 -7.256 na 1.942 6.122 na
0.0001 -2.154 -8.076 na 2.001 6.843 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
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Table 15 
Panel J
Intradaily Price Changes Associated with 
Given Margin Violation Probabilities for 
the September 1994 Contract
Intradaily Price Changes (Margin Levels)
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Probability Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
0.100 -1.448 -1.822 -1.874 1.493 1.670 1.766
0.050 -1.539 -2.257 -2.362 1.585 2.033 2.056
0.040 -1.568 -2.402 -2.631 1.613 2.151 2.116
0.030 -1.603 -2.594 -2.667 1.649 2.306 2.132
0.020 -1.652 -2.873 -2.922 1.697 2.528 2.668
0.010 -1.732 -3.377 -3.064 1.777 2.921 2.710
0.005 -1.808 -3.918 -3.478 1.854 3.331 2.845
0.004 -1.833 -4.101 -3.478 1.878 3.467 2.845
0.003 -1.863 -4.343 na 1.908 3.646 na
0.002 -1.905 -4.698 na 1.951 3.903 na
0.001 -1.976 -5.341 na 2.021 4.360 na
0.0005 -2.044 -6.033 na 2.089 4.838 na
0.0004 -2.065 -6.268 na 2.111 4.997 na
0.0003 -2.093 -6.578 na 2.138 5.205 na
0.0002 -2.131 -7.033 na 2.176 5.506 na
0.0001 -2.195 -7.856 na 2.240 6.040 na
Intradaily price changes are calculated using Equations 
(39) and (40) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(41) and (42) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(43) and (44) for the empirical distributions.
180
Table 16 
Panel A
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the June 1992 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
10% 0 .0 0 0 0.001 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
5% 0 . 0 0 0 0.004 0 .000 0 .0 0 0 0.002 0 . 0 0 0
4% 0 .0 0 0 0.008 0.006 0 .0 0 0 0.004 0 . 0 0 0
3% 0 .0 0 0 0.016 0.006 0 .0 0 0 0.009 0 . 0 0 0
2% 0.002 0.044 0.034 0 .0 0 0 0.029 0.034
1% 0.982 0.188 0.218 0.784 0.157 0.162
0.5% 1 .0 0 0 0.509 0.480 1 .000 0.480 0.458
0.4% 1 .0 0 0 0.626 0.609 1 .000 0.600 0.575
0.3% 1 .000 0.757 0.760 1 .000 0.734 0.709
0.2% 1 .0 0 0 0.883 0.888 1 .000 0.865 0.860
0.1% 1 .0 0 0 0.969 0.983 1 .000 0.958 0.989
0.05% 1 .0 0 0 0.990 0.994 1 .000 0.984 1 .0 0 0
0.04% 1 .000 0.992 0.994 1 .000 0.987 1 .0 0 0
0.03% 1 .0 0 0 0.994 0.994 1 .000 0.990 1 .0 0 0
0.02% 1 .0 0 0 0.996 1 .000 1 .000 0.992 1 .0 0 0
0.01% 1 .0 0 0 0.997 1 .000 1 .000 0.994 1 .0 0 0
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel B
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the September 1994 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
10% 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
5% 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
4% 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.001 0 .0 0 0
3% 0 . 0 0 0 0.001 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0.002 0 .0 0 0
2% 0 . 0 0 0 0.007 0 , 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0.010 0 .0 0 0
1% 0 . 0 0 0 0.073 0.078 0 . 0 0 0 0.091 0.113
0.5% 0.582 0.394 0.365 0.722 0.423 0.409
0.4% 0.946 0.555 0.530 0.983 0.573 0.522
0.3% 1 .0 0 0 0.750 0.783 1 .0 0 0 0.747 0.754
0.2% 1 . 0 0 0 0.920 0.913 1 .0 0 0 0.903 0.922
0.1% 1 . 0 0 0 0.993 0.991 1 .0 0 0 0.986 1 .0 0 0
0.05% 1 . 0 0 0 0.999 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.997 1 .000
0.04% 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.998 1 .000
0.03% 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0.999 1 .000
0.02% 1 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0.999 1 .0 0 0
0.01% 1 .0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .000 1 . 0 0 0 1 .0 0 0
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel c
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the December 1992 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 na 0.000
10% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 na 0.000
5% 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 na 0.000
4% 0.000 0.008 0.011 0.000 na 0.000
3% 0.000 0.020 0.011 0.000 na 0.000
2% 0.001 0.064 0.059 0.000 na 0.032
1% 0.906 0.283 0.306 0.863 na 0.274
0.5% 1.000 0.636 0.613 1.000 na 0.586
0.4% 1.000 0.730 0.710 1.000 na 0.661
0.3% 1.000 0.822 0.812 1.000 na 0.737
0.2% 1.000 0.902 0.882 1.000 na 0.860
0.1% 1.000 0.959 0.973 1.000 na 0.973
0.05% 1.000 0.977 1.000 1.000 na 0.995
0.04% 1.000 0.980 1.000 1.000 na 0.995
0.03% 1.000 0.982 1.000 1.000 na 0.995
0.02% 1.000 0.985 1.000 1.000 na 1.000
0.01% 1.000 0.987 1.000 1.000 na 1.000
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel D
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the March 1993 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 na 0.000
10% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 na 0.000
5% 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 na 0.000
4% 0.000 0.005 0.011 0.000 na 0.000
3% 0.000 0.015 0.011 0.000 na 0.000
2% 0.001 0.055 0.048 0.000 na 0.037
1% 0.230 0.301 0.299 0.225 na 0.321
0.5% 1.000 0.724 0.738 1.000 na 0.695
0.4% 1.000 0.825 0.818 1.000 na 0.824
0.3% 1.000 0.911 0.888 1.000 na 0.882
0.2% 1.000 0.967 0.973 1.000 na 0.941
0.1% 1.000 0.993 0.984 1.000 na 0.979
0.05% 1.000 0.998 0.995 1.000 na 0.989
0.04% 1.000 0.998 0.995 1.000 na 0.989
0.03% 1.000 0.999 0.995 1.000 na 0.989
0.02% 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 na 1.000
0.01% 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 na 1.000
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel E
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the June 1993 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5% 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4% 0.000 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000
3% 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.006
2% 0.000 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.023 0.011
1% 0.095 0.202 0.236 0.029 0.189 0.218
0.5% 1.000 0.584 0.586 0.995 0.598 0.580
0.4% 1.000 0.702 0.701 1.000 0.721 0.713
0.3% 1.000 0.819 0.828 1.000 0.838 0.856
0.2% 1.000 0.916 0.908 1.000 0.930 0.931
0.1% 1.000 0.975 0.966 1.000 0.981 0.966
0.05% 1.000 0.990 0.989 1.000 0.992 0.983
0.04% 1.000 0.992 0.989 1.000 0.994 0.983
0.03% 1.000 0.993 1.000 1.000 0.995 1.000
0.02% 1.000 0.995 1.000 1.000 0.996 1.000
0.01% 1.000 0.996 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel F
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the September 1993 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
10% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
5% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
4% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.001 0 . 0 0 0
3% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.004 0 . 0 0 0
2% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0.011 0 . 0 0 0 0.023 0.017
1% 0.536 na 0.234 0.477 0.188 0.183
0.5% 1 . 0 0 0 na 0.594 1 . 0 0 0 0.573 0.611
0.4% 1 . 0 0 0 na 0.726 1 . 0 0 0 0.689 0.691
0.3% 1 . 0 0 0 na 0.806 1 . 0 0 0 0.804 0.771
0.2% 1 . 0 0 0 na 0.886 1 . 0 0 0 0.901 0.909
0.1% 1,000 na 0.960 1 . 0 0 0 0.964 0.966
0.05% 1 . 0 0 0 na 0.994 1 . 0 0 0 0.982 1 . 0 0 0
0.04% 1 . 0 0 0 na 0.994 1 . 0 0 0 0.985 1 . 0 0 0
0.03% 1 . 0 0 0 na 1 .0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0.987 1 . 0 0 0
0.02% 1 . 0 0 0 na 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0.989 1 . 0 0 0
0.01% 1 . 0 0 0 na 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0.991 1 . 0 0 0
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel G
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the December 1993 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long FutureB Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0 .0 0 0 na 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
10% 0 . 0 0 0 na 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
5% 0 .0 0 0 na 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
4% 0 .0 0 0 na 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.001 0 . 0 0 0
3% 0 .0 0 0 na 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.004 0 . 0 0 0
2% 0 .0 0 0 na 0.006 0 . 0 0 0 0.027 0.017
1% 0.332 na 0.264 0.299 0.235 0.183
0.5% 1 .0 0 0 na 0.626 1 .0 0 0 0.626 0.611
0.4% 1 .0 0 0 na 0.724 1 .0 0 0 0.726 0.691
0.3% 1 .000 na 0.822 1 .0 0 0 0.820 0.771
0.2% 1 .000 na 0.902 1 .0 0 0 0.898 0.909
0.1% 1 .0 0 0 na 0.954 1 .0 0 0 0.953 0.966
0.05% 1 .0 0 0 na 0.977 1 .0 0 0 0.971 1 .0 0 0
0.04% 1 .0 0 0 na 0.977 1 .0 0 0 0.974 1 .0 0 0
0.03% 1 .0 0 0 na 0.983 1 .0 0 0 0.977 1 . 0 0 0
0.02% 1 .0 0 0 na 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.980 1 . 0 0 0
0.01% 1 .0 0 0 na 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.981 1 . 0 0 0
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel H
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the March 1994 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0 .000 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
10% 0 .000 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0
5% 0 .000 0.002 0 .0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.001 0 .0 0 0
4% 0 .0 0 0 0.006 0.006 0 . 0 0 0 0.003 0 .0 0 0
3% 0 .0 0 0 0.020 0.024 0 . 0 0 0 0.013 0.006
2% 0.013 0.077 0.055 0 . 0 0 0 0.064 0.067
1% 0.995 0.358 0.376 0.977 0.352 0.364
0.5% 1 .000 0.714 0.700 1 .0 0 0 0.718 0.721
0.4% 1 .000 0.792 0.794 1 .0 0 0 0.796 0.800
0.3% 1 .000 0.863 0.842 1 .0 0 0 0.865 0.848
0.2% 1 .000 0.921 0.921 1 .0 0 0 0.921 0.915
0.1% 1 .000 0.961 0.982 1 .0 0 0 0.960 0.970
0.05% 1.000 0.975 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.974 0.988
0.04% 1.000 0.978 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.976 0.988
0.03% 1.000 0.980 1 .000 1 . 0 0 0 0.978 0.988
0.02% 1 .000 0.982 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.980 1 .000
0.01% 1 .000 0.984 1 .000 1 .0 0 0 0.982 1 .000
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel I
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the June 1994 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5% 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
4% 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
3% 0.000 0.020 0.017 0.000 0.009 0.006
2% 0.001 0.083 0.079 0.000 0.048 0.040
1% 0.934 0.377 0.381 0.643 0.325 0.313
0.5% 1.000 0.713 0.705 1.000 0.745 0.756
0.4% 1.000 0.784 0.790 1.000 0.834 0.830
0.3% 1.000 0.849 0.841 1.000 0.907 0.903
0.2% 1.000 0.904 0.898 1.000 0.958 0.966
0.1% 1.000 0.945 0.949 1.000 0.986 0.983
0.05% 1.000 0.961 0.966 1.000 0.993 0.994
0.04% 1.000 0.964 0.977 1.000 0.994 1.000
0.03% 1.000 0.967 0.977 1.000 0.995 1.000
0.02% 1.000 0.969 1.000 1.000 0.996 1.000
0.01% 1.000 0.971 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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Table 16 
Panel J
Margin Violation Probabilities Given 
Associated Price Changes for 
the September 1994 Contract
Margin Violation Probability
Absolute
Margin
Level
Long Futures Position Short Futures Position
Normal Extreme Empirical Normal Extreme Empirical
20% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10% 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5% 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4% 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
3% 0.000 0.017 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.000
2% 0.001 0.075 0.080 0.001 0.053 0.068
1% 0.873 0.387 0.377 0.930 0.357 0.346
0.5% 1.000 0.762 0.759 1.000 0.759 0.747
0.4% 1.000 0.836 0.840 1.000 0.838 0.852
0.3% 1.000 0.899 0.901 1.000 0.903 0.926
0.2% 1.000 0.946 0.951 1.000 0.951 0.975
0.1% 1.000 0.976 0.969 1.000 0.980 0.981
0.05% 1.000 0.986 0.988 1.000 0.988 0.981
0.04% 1.000 0.987 0.994 1.000 0.990 0.988
0.03% 1.000 0.989 0.994 1.000 0.995 0.988
0.02% 1.000 0.990 1.000 1.000 0.991 1.000
0.01% 1.000 0.991 1.000 1.000 0.993 1.000
The margin violation probabilities are calculated from 
Equation (34) for the extreme value distribution, Equations
(32) and (33) for the normal distribution, and Equations
(35) and (36) for the empirical distribution.
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The extreme value distribution appears to be a much 
better representation of the empirical distribution than 
the normal distribution function. This relationship is 
evident in almost every panel found in both Tables 15 and 
16, and is relatively robust to whatever contract chosen. 
Not only are the extreme value distribution results closer 
to the empirical distribution calculations, they also 
exhibit a greater sensitivity to changes in given margin 
violation probabilities than the normal figures.
3.6 CHAPTER 3 SUMMARY
The objective of Chapter 3 was to provide information 
related to the distributional characteristics of extreme 
intradaily price changes of DAX futures contracts and to 
provide accurate probabilities of observing those extreme 
values. This objective was framed within a margin setting 
example. The practical goal of this exercise was to 
contribute valuable insight on the feasibility of using 
extreme value theory by the DTB/s margin setting committee 
when setting intradaily margin requirements.
The results of the analysis can be summarized as 
follows. First, the intradaily extreme price movements of 
DAX stock index futures contracts appear to follow a Type 
II extreme value limiting distribution. This result is 
intuitive and provides additional evidence that high 
frequency financial data are generated by non-normal data 
generation processes.
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Secondly, the extreme value distribution generates 
extreme intradaily price movements, given set probability 
levels, and probability levels, given set intradaily price 
changes, that are closer to those observed in the data 
samples than the normal distribution. These results 
indicate that the extreme value statistical technique is a 
useful tool to apply when extrapolating the probability of 
observing extremes outside the boundaries set by the data.
The normative implication of this study is that margin 
setting committees should use extreme value theory as an 
aid in setting prudent margin levels. The prudent action 
is being able to better protect against trader default 
resulting from extreme price movements of the invested 
asset. The extreme value statistical technique is shown to 
be a superior statistical tool for generating realistic 
probabilities of margin default than assuming normally 
distributed data.
CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY AMD SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The objective of this dissertation was to examine the 
price discovery and risk processes of Germany's stock index 
and stock index futures market. The price discovery 
process was analyzed using the information processing 
speed, via lead-lag, between each market. The risk process 
was examined via the properties of the extreme values found 
in the futures market.
The results of the lead-lag analysis indicate that, on 
average, the futures market tends to process information 
more quickly than the spot market. However, there exists a 
feedback of information processing indicating that the 
futures market does not completely dominate the information 
processing capability of the spot market.
The futures market processing time appears to be 
increased when market participants posses market-wide 
information, but decreased when the market experiences 
large (extreme) price movements. Suggestions for future 
research in this area should concentrate on: (1) Why 
Deutsche Bank and Allianz appear to lead the futures market 
on occasion (2) the differential information processing 
aspects found in extreme price movement markets, and (3) 
the impacts of defining trading activity in different ways, 
either by volume or number of transactions.
The results of the extreme value analysis indicate 
that extreme price changes of the futures market follow a
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Type II limiting extreme value distribution. Applying this 
result in a prudent margin setting framework indicates that 
using the extreme value distribution yields better 
protection against price movements than assuming normally 
distributed data.
Suggested future research in this area is related to 
determining the stationary/non-stationary characteristics 
of the extreme value parameters, and examining multi­
contract price movement impacts on the extreme value 
distribution.
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